

# Ten Thousand Commandments

## An Annual Snapshot of the Federal Regulatory State

2020 Edition

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### Executive Summary

Spending control and deficit restraint are indispensable to a nation's stability and long-term economic health. Yet alarm over lack of spending restraint under President Donald Trump's administration, even with the benefit of a healthy economy, has not stemmed disbursements.<sup>1</sup> Without significant changes, more will soon be spent on debt service than on the entire defense budget, especially as interest rates rise.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile, magical thinking that government outlays create wealth is now fashionable among emboldened progressives who advocate Medicare for All, a Green New Deal, and a guaranteed national income, while supposed fiscal conservatives have lost the appetite for addressing spending.<sup>3</sup>

In March 2019, the White House budget proposal requested \$4.746 trillion in outlays for fiscal year (FY) 2020, with annual spending projected to top \$5 trillion in 2022.<sup>4</sup> This year, the Congressional Budget Office's January 2020 *Budget and Economic Outlook*, covering 2020 to 2030, shows discretionary, entitlement, and interest spending exceeded \$4.4 trillion in FY 2019 and projects spend-

ing above \$5 trillion by FY 2022, and nearly \$7.5 trillion by 2030.<sup>5</sup> The national debt now stands at \$23.2 trillion, up more than \$2 trillion since 2018.<sup>6</sup>

As imposing as that is, the cost of government extends even beyond what Washington collects in taxes and the far greater amount it spends. Federal environmental, safety and health, and economic regulations and interventions affect the economy by hundreds of billions—even trillions—of dollars annually. These regulatory burdens can operate as a hidden tax.<sup>7</sup> Unlike on-budget spending, regulatory costs caused by government are largely obscured from public view. As the least disciplined aspect of government activity, regulation can be appealing to lawmakers. Budgetary pressures can incentivize lawmakers to impose off-budget regulations on the private sector rather than add to unpopular deficit spending. For example, a government job training or child care initiative could involve either increasing government spending or imposing new regulations that require businesses to provide those ben-

efits. Just as firms generally pass the costs of some taxes along to consumers, some regulatory compliance costs and mandates borne by businesses will percolate throughout the economy, finding their way into consumer prices and workers' wages.<sup>8</sup>

When the U.S. federal administrative state began its growth a century ago, few likely imagined the tangle of rules it would yield and how those would envelop the economy and society. Over several decades, rules have accumulated year after year with little retrenchment. Over the past three years, there have been some reversals in this regard, such as a slowdown in the issuing of new rules and some rollbacks of existing ones, but there remain reasons for concern.

One of the Trump administration's first directives was a memorandum to executive branch agencies titled "Regulatory Freeze Pending Review."<sup>9</sup> Presidents routinely take similar steps to review predecessors' pending actions and prioritize their own.<sup>10</sup> The president went further in issuing a series of actions related to general regulatory process reform, reforming the executive branch itself, and streamlining internal agency processes and timeliness of regulatory approvals and removing undue burdens generally.

Some of Trump's executive actions since taking office worryingly have gone the other way, such as emphasizing trade restrictions, anti-dumping, "buy American" agendas, and more.<sup>11</sup> The extensive executive actions undertaken aimed at liberalization have been both broad-based and sector-specific to areas such as financial regulation, antiquities and national monuments, offshore resource access, education, health care,<sup>12</sup> agricultural biotechnology, and more (see Box 1).

Since the federal government heavily influences society through regulation as well as spending, lawmakers should work toward thorough tracking and disclosure of regulatory costs and perform periodic housecleaning. The limited cost-benefit analysis currently undertaken by agencies relies largely on agency self-reporting and covers

only a fraction of rules.<sup>13</sup> Regulators are reluctant to acknowledge when a rule's benefits do not justify its costs. In fact, one could expect agencies to devise new and suspect categories of benefits to justify rulemaking.<sup>14</sup>

Excess regulation is largely driven by the longstanding delegation by Congress of its rightful lawmaking power to executive branch regulatory agencies. Addressing that situation effectively will require the restoration of Congress' duties under Article I of the Constitution rather than "mere" administrative law reforms. This could take the form of congressional votes on significant or controversial agency rules before they become binding. Getting lawmakers on the record as supporting or opposing specific rules would reestablish congressional accountability and affirm a principle of "no regulation without representation."<sup>15</sup>

Federal regulatory transparency report cards, similar to the presentation in *Ten Thousand Commandments*, could be issued each year to distill information for the public and policy makers about the scope of the regulatory state.<sup>16</sup> Scattered government and private data exist about the number of regulations issued by agencies and their costs and effects. Improving and compiling some of that information can shed light on the scope of the federal regulatory enterprise. That goal is central to the annual *Ten Thousand Commandments* report.

The 2020 edition of *Ten Thousand Commandments* is the latest in an annual series that examines the scope of the federal regulatory state to help illustrate the need for measures like regulatory budgeting and ultimately congressional accountability. This report contains seven major elements:

1. A bulleted summary of highlights.
2. An overview of ways the Trump administration has attempted to stem the flow of regulations and roll back old ones.
3. A detailed discussion of Trump's own regulatory impulses—implemented, pending, and potential—that could undermine his own regulatory effort.

## Box I. Prominent Executive Actions on Regulatory Process Reform during Trump's First Three Years

### 2017

- Presidential Memorandum, Streamlining Permitting and Reducing Regulatory Burdens for Domestic Manufacturing, January 24, 2017.<sup>17</sup>
- Executive Order 13755, Expediting Environmental Reviews and Approvals for High Priority Infrastructure Projects, January 24, 2017.<sup>18</sup>
- Executive Order 13771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, January 30, 2017.<sup>19</sup>
- Executive Order 13772, Core Principles for Regulating the United States Financial System, February 3, 2017.<sup>20</sup>
- Executive Order 13777, Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda, February 24, 2017.<sup>21</sup>
- Executive Order 13781, Comprehensive Plan for Reorganizing the Executive Branch, March 13, 2017.<sup>22</sup>
- Executive Order 13777, Identifying and Reducing Tax Regulatory Burdens, April 21, 2017.<sup>23</sup>
- Executive Order 13790, Promoting Agriculture and Rural Prosperity in America, April 25, 2017.<sup>24</sup>
- Executive Order 13792, Review of Designations under the Antiquities Act, April 26, 2017.<sup>25</sup>
- Executive Order 13791, Enforcing Statutory Prohibitions on Federal Control of Education, April 26, 2017.<sup>26</sup>
- Executive Order 13795, Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy, April 28, 2017.<sup>27</sup>
- Executive Order 13807, Establishing Discipline and Accountability in the Environmental Review and Permitting Process for Infrastructure Projects, August 15, 2017.<sup>28</sup>
- Executive Order 13813, Promoting Healthcare Choice and Competition across the United States, October 12, 2017.<sup>29</sup>

### 2018

- Presidential Memorandum, Memorandum for the Secretary of the Interior: Supporting Broadband Tower Facilities in Rural America on Federal Properties Managed by the Department of the Interior, January 8, 2018.<sup>30</sup>

- Executive Order 13821, Streamlining and Expediting Requests to Locate Broadband Facilities in Rural America, January 8, 2018.<sup>31</sup>
- Presidential Memorandum, Promoting Domestic Manufacturing and Job Creation—Policies and Procedures Relating to Implementation of Air Quality Standards, April 12, 2018.<sup>32</sup>
- Executive Order 13847, Strengthening Retirement Security in America, August 31, 2018.<sup>33</sup>
- Presidential Memorandum, Promoting the Reliable Supply and Delivery of Water in the West, October 19, 2018.<sup>34</sup>
- Presidential Memorandum, Developing a Sustainable Spectrum Strategy for America's Future, October 25, 2018.<sup>35</sup>

### 2019

- Executive Order 13855, Promoting Active Management of America's Forests, Rangelands, and other Federal Lands to Improve Conditions and Reduce Wildfire Risk, December 21, 2018.<sup>36</sup>
- Executive Order 13891, Promoting the Rule of Law through Improved Agency Guidance Documents, October 9, 2019.<sup>37</sup>
- Executive Order 13892, Promoting the Rule of Law through Transparency and Fairness in Civil Administrative Enforcement and Adjudication, October 9, 2019.<sup>38</sup>
- Executive Order 13879, Advancing American Kidney Health, July 15, 2019.<sup>39</sup>
- Executive Order 13878, Establishing a White House Council on Eliminating Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing, June 25, 2019.<sup>40</sup>
- Executive Order 13874, Modernizing the Regulatory Framework for Agricultural Biotechnology Products, June 11, 2019.<sup>41</sup>
- Executive Order 13868, Promoting Energy Infrastructure and Economic Growth, April 10, 2019.<sup>42</sup>

4. An overview of the scope of the regulatory state, including a taxonomy of categories and instances of unmeasured costs of regulation and intervention, and depictions of its appraised size compared with federal budgetary components and gross domestic product (GDP).

5. An analysis of trends in the numbers of rules and regulations issued by agencies, based on information provided in the *Federal Register* and in the Regulatory Plan and Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions. This section also provides a brief survey of memo-

randa, notices, and other “regulatory dark matter,” and examines implementation of Trump’s “one-in, two-out” process for new regulations and its limitations.

6. Recommendations for reform that emphasize disclosure and improving congressional accountability for rulemaking.
7. An appendix containing historical tables of regulatory trends over past decades.

For the good of the nation’s stability and economic health, the regulatory process should be made as transparent as possible and be brought under greater democratic accountability and constitutional norms. Some highlights from the report follow.

- Apart from sector-specific executive orders and memoranda, there are six prominent ways the Trump administration has streamlined regulation so far:
  - Elimination of 15 rules and one guidance document via the Congressional Review Act (CRA);
  - Delay or withdrawal of 1,570 of Obama administration rules in the pipeline;
  - Multipronged streamlining of permitting for pipelines, bridges, 5G broadband, rural broadband, and other infrastructure;
  - Agency restraint in initiating large, significant rulemakings;
  - Continued progress, albeit with declining marginal returns, on the presidential requirement that agencies eliminate at least two rules for every one issued;
  - Steps toward addressing agency guidance documents and other sub-regulatory decrees.
- In fiscal year 2019, the administration’s ratio for significant rules out to significant rules in was 1.7 to 1. Employing all rules eliminated, the ratio was 4.3 to 1, still meeting goals of Executive Order 13771, “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs.”
- *Agencies’ stated priorities and “inventories” of rules signal some warning signs for Trump’s deregulatory agenda.* While the

Trump administration can be said to have technically met the goal of implementing a “one-in, two-out” process for federal regulations over the past three years taken as a whole, the longer-term horizon plainly shows agencies poised to reverse this and to issue substantially more regulatory actions than deregulatory ones.

- *Some warning signs are of Trump’s own creation.* President Trump’s regulatory streamlining is being offset by his own favorable comments and explicit actions toward regulatory intervention in the following areas:
  - Antitrust intervention
  - Financial regulation
  - Hospital and pharmaceutical price transparency mandates and price controls
  - Speech and social media regulation
  - Tech regulation
  - Digital taxes
  - Bipartisan large-scale infrastructure spending with regulatory effects
  - Trade restrictions
  - Farming and agriculture
  - Subsidies with regulatory effect
  - Telecommunications regulation, including for 5G infrastructure
  - Personal liberties: health-tracking, vaping, supplements, and firearms
  - Industrial policy or market socialist funding mechanisms (in scientific research, artificial intelligence, and a Space Force)
  - Welfare and labor regulations (job training, the new family leave)
- Given the limited available federal government data and reports, as well as contemporary studies—and the federal government’s failure to provide a regularly updated estimate of the aggregate costs of regulation—this report employs a placeholder estimate for regulatory compliance and economic effects of federal intervention of \$1.9 trillion annually. This is for purposes of context and rudimentary comparison with federal spending and other economic metrics. This report also presents an outline of

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*Trump’s regulatory streamlining could be offset by his actions favorable toward regulatory intervention.*

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the vast sweep of intervention and policies for which costs are disregarded.

- The burden of regulatory intervention is equivalent to over 40 percent of the level of federal spending, projected to be \$4.6 trillion in 2020.
- Regulatory costs of \$1.9 trillion amount to 9 percent of U.S. GDP, which was estimated at \$21.54 trillion in 2019 by the Commerce Department's Bureau of Economic Analysis.
- When regulatory costs are combined with estimated federal FY 2019 outlays of \$4.447 trillion, the federal government's share of the entire economy reaches 30 percent (state and local spending and regulation would add to that).
- If it were a country, U.S. regulation would be the world's eighth-largest economy (not counting the U.S. itself), ranking behind Italy and ahead of Brazil.
- The regulatory hidden "tax" is equivalent to federal individual and corporate income tax receipts combined, which totaled \$1.914 trillion in 2019 (\$1.698 trillion in individual income tax revenues and \$216 billion in corporate income tax revenues).
- Regulatory costs rival corporate pretax profits of \$2.063 trillion.
- If one assumed that all costs of federal regulation and intervention flowed all the way down to households, U.S. households would "pay" \$14,455 annually on average in a regulatory hidden tax. That amounts to 18 percent of the average pretax income of \$78,635 and 24 percent of the average expenditure budget of \$61,224. The regulatory "tax" exceeds every item in the household budget except housing. That means that an average American household "spends" more on embedded regulation than on health care, food, transportation, entertainment, apparel, services, or savings.
- Calendar year 2019 ended with 2,964 final rules in the *Federal Register*, which was the lowest count since records began being kept in the 1970s and is the only sub-3,000 tally ever (in the 1990s and early 2000s, rule counts regularly exceeded 4,000 annually).
- During calendar year 2019, while agencies issued those 2,964 rules, Congress enacted "only" 105 laws. Thus, agencies issued 28 rules for every law enacted by Congress. This "Unconstitutionality Index"—the ratio of regulations issued by agencies to laws passed by Congress and signed by the president—highlights the entrenched delegation of lawmaking power to unelected agency officials. As it happens, the average ratio for the past decade has also been 28.
- In 2017, Trump's first year, the *Federal Register* finished at 61,308 pages, the lowest count since 1993 and a 36 percent drop from President Barack Obama's 95,894 pages, which had been the highest level in history. The 2019 *Federal Register* tally rose to 70,938 pages. However, Trump's rollbacks of rules—and as noted there are far fewer rules overall—also necessarily add to rather than subtract from the *Register*.
- The Weidenbaum Center at Washington University in St. Louis and the George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center in Washington, DC, jointly estimate that agencies spent \$72 billion in fiscal year 2019 to administer and police the federal regulatory state. This on-budget sum is in addition to compliance and economic burdens.
- At the end of calendar year 2019, 2,131 proposed rules were contained in the *Federal Register* pipeline.
- In contrast to the 2,964 rules finalized in calendar year 2019, 68 federal departments, agencies, and commissions have in the pipeline 3,752 regulatory actions at various stages of implementation (recently completed, active, and long-term stages), according to the fall 2019 Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions. Of the 3,752 rules, 689 are "Deregulatory" for Executive Order 13771 purposes, broken down as follows:
  - Of 2,602 rules in the active phase, 522 are deemed deregulatory.

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*If it were a country, U.S. regulation would be the world's eighth-largest economy.*

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- Of 546 completed rules, 106 are deemed deregulatory.
- Of 604 long-term rules, 613 are deemed deregulatory.
- Of the 3,752 regulations in the Agenda’s pipeline (completed, active, and long-term stages), 192 are “economically significant” rules, which the federal government describes as having annual economic effects of \$100 million or more. Of those 192 rules, 33 are deemed deregulatory for purposes of Trump Executive Order 13771 (11 at the completed stage, 20 at the active stage). Only two are at the planned long-term rule phase.
- Since 1993, when the first edition of *Ten Thousand Commandments* was published, agencies have issued 107,712 rules. Since the *Federal Register* first began itemizing them in 1976, 204,802 final rules have been issued.
- The Trump administration’s spring and fall 2019 editions of the Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions contained a combined 70 completed “economically significant” rules (the counts were 35 and 88 in 2018 and 2017, respectively). The yearly average for Barack Obama’s eight years was 69; George W. Bush’s average over his term was 49. Trump’s average so far is 64, but his Agendas are the first to contain expressly deregulatory economically significant rules for purposes of Executive Order 13771.
- During calendar year 2019 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued 74 reports on “major” rules—a category similar to but slightly broader than economically significant—as the Congressional Review Act requires it to do. In the first year of the Trump administration, the count was 49, the lowest ever. President George W. Bush’s administration averaged 63 major rules annually during his eight years in office. President Obama averaged 86. Obama issued 685 major rules during his term, compared with Bush’s 505. Approaching the end of Trump’s first term, the president’s average is 59 yearly, but a significant portion are deemed deregulatory.
- Of the 3,752 regulations in the pipeline, 644 affect small businesses. Of those, 347 required a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (official assessment of small-business impacts), down from 412 in 2016. An additional 297 were otherwise noted by agencies to affect small businesses in some fashion. Overall, 102 rules affecting small business were deemed “deregulatory.”
- The seven most active rule-producing entities—the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Health and Human Services, the Interior, Transportation, the Treasury, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—account for 2,002 rules, or 53 percent of all rules in the Unified Agenda pipeline.
- President Trump issued 47 executive orders in 2019 (after 63 in 2017 and 35 in 2018). From the nation’s founding through the Obama administration, more than 15,285 executive orders have been issued. President Obama issued a total of 276, similar to President George W. Bush’s 291. Prior to the 20th century, most presidents had no more than a few dozen. In contrast, Woodrow Wilson issued 1,803, Coolidge issued 1,204, and Franklin D. Roosevelt issued 3,467.
- President Trump issued 26 presidential memoranda in 2019, after issuing 38 in 2017, and 30 in 2018. President George W. Bush published 131 memoranda in the *Federal Register* over his entire presidency, whereas President Obama published 257.
- Public notices in the *Federal Register* normally exceed 24,000 annually, with uncounted guidance documents and other proclamations with potential regulatory effect among them (and other guidance documents that do not appear in the *Register* at all). There were 21,804 notices issued in 2019. There have been 616,455 public notices since 1994 and well over a million since the 1970s.
- This executive summary was updated on May 29, 2020 to reflect more accurately the contents of this report.

# 9,999 Commandments? Six Ways Rule Flows Have Been Reduced or Streamlined

This edition of *Ten Thousand Commandments* begins with a survey of approaches the Trump administration took in its first three years to fulfill promises to streamline red tape. The report then puts Trump's numbers in historical context and examines some specifics of implementation of Trump's Executive Order 13771, "Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs," and subsequent White House guidance to eliminate two regulations for every "significant regulatory action" issued.<sup>43</sup>

Assessing agencies' priorities and results to date illustrates some limitations for the prospects for continued streamlining of rules and regulations when presidential attention turns elsewhere (particularly given that the 116th Congress will not enact a legislative regulatory reform package). Barack Obama unapologetically wielded the "pen and phone" to expand federal reach over private affairs.<sup>44</sup> Donald Trump, too, has used the pen and phone, in significant part to attempt to undo Obama programs and otherwise streamline regulation.<sup>45</sup> However, Trump also expresses substantial regulatory impulses of his own that arguably undermine his administration's reform agenda; that will be reviewed here as well. The overarching reality is that the federal government is far larger than ever, and Trump's executive branch reorganization initiative undertaken alongside regulatory streamlining has resulted in the elimination of no regulatory agencies.<sup>46</sup>

Presidents come and presidents go, but few systematically and in such prolonged fashion attempt to freeze and roll back rulemaking. Agencies and outside advocacy groups react strongly to protect the administrative state,

and legal challenges to Trump's regulatory rollback and Executive Order 13771 predictably ensued.<sup>47</sup> A poor record in court for some Trump streamlining measures has been widely noted.<sup>48</sup> These included early judicial rebukes to Trump's efforts to delay implementation of certain elements of the EPA's Waters of the United States rule and of a chemical disaster preparedness and disclosure rule.<sup>49</sup>

The administrative state's fundamental incompatibility with limited government is readily observable in the rulemaking process itself. The 1946 Administrative Procedure Act requires adherence to process for rolling back rules or changing policy, not just for issuing a rule in the first place as court losses show.<sup>50</sup> The Administrative Procedure Act's rulemaking process allows for wiggle room to grow regulation via its "good cause" exemption, by which an agency may deem notice and comment for certain rules as "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest," but that leniency seems not to have applied to rollbacks.<sup>51</sup> Therefore, rules cannot be eliminated via the same "good cause" exemption. Rather, a rule can be replaced only with a new rule or legislation.<sup>52</sup> Further eroding accountability, the logic of the administrative state has generated a judicial philosophy known as *Chevron* deference, whereby courts yield to agencies' interpretations of the enabling statutes under which they write their rules, as long as the agency's interpretation has some "rational basis," which is not much of a restraint.<sup>53</sup>

The two-for-one executive order was explicit regarding its own legal limitations. The Trump approach in Executive Order 13771

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*The Administrative  
Procedure Act  
allows for wiggle  
room to grow  
regulation via  
its "good cause"  
exemption.*

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*The reality is  
that the  
administrative  
state is alive and  
well, powering  
ahead.*

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seems executed well within the rule of law, as much as that concept applies in the context of the administrative state.<sup>54</sup> Executive Order 13771 asserts: “Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect ... the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency. ... This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law.”<sup>55</sup> Reforming or revoking major regulations, like the EPA’s Waters of the United States or Clean Power Plan rules, takes years. As Heritage Foundation analyst James Gattuso said of Trump’s first year: “Given the procedural and institutional obstacles to repealing a rule, it is unlikely that any administration would be able to achieve substantial deregulation.”<sup>56</sup> And sure enough, early on, then-Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director Mick Mulvaney (who then served as White House acting chief of staff until March 2020) affirmed that when it came to rollbacks of Obama “midnight rules” and not-yet-implemented rules in the pipeline, “None of them are very sexy. ... None of them are very glamorous. None of them really rise to the level of getting national attention. But think about that—860 of them.”<sup>57</sup> The big changes, like recodification of the Waters of the United States<sup>58</sup> and Clean Power Plan rules, took time but eventually did occur.<sup>59</sup>

The court losses were a rebuke, but they also highlight the permanence of an entrenched administrative state immune to unilateral reduction in scope. This is not necessarily a bad thing from a long-term perspective, as it can help shift the focus to where it belongs—on a Congress with transitory membership that has delegated away much of its lawmaking power to executive branch agencies and their career personnel.

Curiously, while the impression is given by opponents that Trump’s rollbacks are illegal and undermine health and safety and “safeguards”<sup>60</sup> in their sweeping character, other progressive commentators, covering all the bases presumably, call Trump’s boasts a “deregulation myth.”<sup>61</sup> Complaints, sometimes contradictory, range from the dismissive observation that the administration

“claims credit for some regulatory actions begun under Obama”<sup>62</sup> to the claim that Trump merely wants to offload red tape to the government.<sup>63</sup> We find progressives’ characterization of a “war on regulation”<sup>64</sup> and Paul Krugman’s outlandish claim that “Donald Trump Is Trying to Kill You.”<sup>65</sup> We have claims that the “rollback has largely been a bust. In some cases, in fact, it’s been an outright fraud.”<sup>66</sup> So Trump is both overreaching and not accomplishing anything, according to progressives and other opponents. Both cannot be true.<sup>67</sup>

The success or failure dispute notwithstanding, the reality is that the administrative state is alive and well, powering ahead. While improvements can be made to the implementation of Executive Order 13771<sup>68</sup> and to newer orders issued to restrain abuse of guidance documents, a president can achieve only a limited streamlining in a systemic imbalance tilted toward escalating administrative state power.<sup>69</sup> Executive Order 13771, in an arena in which agencies make most law, underscores what a president may *not* do acting alone.<sup>70</sup> As such, Executive Order 13771 represents a voluntary weakening of executive power regarding certain regulation (we are not addressing wider policy matters in this context). The underlying message of Executive Order 13771 is that of Article I of the Constitution: If something needs to be regulated, Congress should pass a law. In the meantime, in implementing Executive Order 13771 and reporting results, the Trump administration now explicitly separates actions deemed deregulatory from those deemed regulatory. This designation could have staying power and be carried forward by subsequent administrations.

Meanwhile, Executive Order 13771 did not apply either to rules from independent agencies like the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) or the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB) or to rules mandated by Congress, as opposed to those spearheaded by agencies themselves. Substantial regulatory streamlining of these require either new rulemaking or legislation.

Trump’s regulatory rollbacks over the past three years—limited given their largely unilateral implementation within the inertia of a rigid preexisting administrative state—have consisted of six main elements:

**First**, 14 rules that had been finalized during the closing months of the Obama administration and on track to take effect were eliminated using the CRA in 2017, via individual resolutions of disapproval passed by Congress and signed by Trump.<sup>71</sup> The rules removed were generally not headline-grabbing reforms, nor all major ones.<sup>72</sup> There were hundreds of rules eligible to be rolled back, which provides the reality check that businesses often favor regulation that provide advantages over rivals.<sup>73</sup> An additional rule not originated under Obama and one guidance document from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau were also eliminated by resolution of disapproval in 2018. In similar fashion, when Trump leaves office, rules issued in the waning months of his presidency, including those meant to streamline, would be similarly vulnerable.

**Second**, the Trump administration withdrew or delayed 1,579 Obama administration rules that were in the pipeline at the time of inauguration but not yet finalized, as follows:<sup>74</sup>

- 635 withdrawn;
- 244 made inactive;
- 700 delayed.

**Third**, streamlining permitting for bridges, pipelines, transportation, telecommunications, and other infrastructure is being interpreted as creating a more favorable climate for infrastructure planning.<sup>75</sup> This manifested in several ways, such as the permitting-related executive actions noted in Box 1, the Commerce Department’s permit streamlining action plan (which contained a collection of rule recommendations),<sup>76</sup> and some elements, with caveats, of the 2019 Trump Budget proposal addressing infrastructure reform.<sup>77</sup>

**Fourth**, to the limited extent possible, agencies have largely abstained from issuing sig-

nificant new regulatory initiatives. While more significant rules have been removed than added, such rules still have been added. Trump’s total final rule counts were 3,281 in 2017; 3,368 in 2018; and 2,964 in 2019, compared to Obama’s 2016 tally of 3,853 (these are calendar years).<sup>78</sup> Of Obama’s finalized rules, 486 were categorized as “significant.” The “significant” subset for Trump has been 199, 108, and only 66 for the past three years, respectively. Even these lower rule counts can still overstate agencies’ conventional rulemaking activity, since some “rules” have been and are Executive Order 13771–driven delays or rollbacks of existing rules.

**Fifth**, the Trump administration technically exceeded the one-in, two-out goals for adoption of significant regulatory actions in the first two fiscal years,<sup>79</sup> but the increasing difficulty of rule offsets led to not quite meeting the objective in fiscal year 2019 without rounding up.<sup>80</sup> In implementing the streamlining process, two OMB guidance documents on the one-in, two-out executive order were issued after the order itself.<sup>81</sup> Further, another 2017 executive order established Regulatory Reform Task Forces at various agencies.<sup>82</sup> Agencies also sought public input on rule streamlining.<sup>83</sup> But these changes are bumping against limits. Since the administration is acting without any bipartisan support from Congress, rewriting rules under the strictures of the Administrative Procedure Act becomes the only option left as Trump’s Executive Order 13771 one-in, two-out campaign matures, and that affects the ratio considerably.

However, while it inevitably becomes harder to eliminate more than two rules for each added without Congress contributing to the effort, the point of the spear of the Trump deregulatory program is the capping of net new regulatory costs at zero, for which the regulatory eliminations are a tool—a mini-regulatory budget of sorts. “By requiring a reduction in the number of regulations, the order incentivizes agencies to identify regulations and guidance documents that do not provide sufficient benefits to the public,”

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*Businesses often favor regulation that provide advantages over rivals.*

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Table I. Significant Regulatory Actions

|                                  | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | Total |
|----------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|-------|
| Regulatory                       | 3      | 14     | 35     | 52    |
| Deregulatory                     | 67     | 57     | 61     | 185   |
| Claimed ratio—rules out/rules in | 22/1   | 4/1    | 1.7/1  | 3.6/1 |

noted then-OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) Administrator Neomi Rao in the “Introduction to the Fall 2018 Regulatory Plan.”<sup>84</sup> In that respect, the administration claimed net regulatory cost savings of \$50.9 billion in total present-value regulatory costs across the government between 2017 and 2019, with \$13.5 billion of that occurring in 2019.<sup>85</sup> The trajectory of out/in follows:

In 2017, the White House maintained that the goal of one-in, two-out for regulations was exceeded with a claimed 22-to-one out/in ratio, since only three “significant” new regulatory actions were imposed during that fiscal year, while 67 reductions were made.<sup>86</sup> Six rules included in the roundup of 67 were among the 15 eliminated via Congressional Review Act resolutions of disapproval. Interestingly, among the initial 67 rule reductions, nine appeared to be revocations or alterations of sub-regulatory guidance, notices, orders, or information collections.

A bewildering rulemaking nomenclature places regulations into an array of categories encompassing such terms as rules, significant rules, major rules, economically significant rules, guidance, and more.<sup>87</sup> Some independent agency rules were removed via CRA procedures but not taken as “credit” for two-for-one purposes, since the order did not bind independent agencies. Examples of these included a CFPB arbitration rule,<sup>88</sup> a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule on foreign resource extraction payment disclosure,<sup>89</sup> and an FCC broadband privacy regulation.<sup>90</sup> The FCC’s elimination of Obama-era net neutrality rules<sup>91</sup> and modernization of broadcast ownership rules are among significant undertakings not included in two-for-one, but like all substantial final

rules, new rulemaking proceedings can be lengthy.<sup>92</sup>

In 2018, OIRA reported in “Regulatory Reform Results for Fiscal Year 2018” that “Agencies issued 176 deregulatory actions and 14 significant regulatory actions,” for an overall 12-to-one ratio.<sup>93</sup> Fifty-seven of these deregulatory actions were deemed significant, so comparing significant deregulatory to significant regulatory actions yielded a four-to-one ratio.<sup>94</sup>

In 2019, OIRA reported in “Regulatory Reform Results for Fiscal Year 2019” that “Agencies issued 150 deregulatory actions and 35 significant regulatory actions,” for an overall 4.3-to-one ratio.<sup>95</sup> Sixty-one deregulatory actions were significant, so comparing significant deregulatory to significant regulatory actions yields a ratio of 1.7 to 1.<sup>96</sup>

Below is a summary of the three Trump fiscal years of claimed significant reductions. The overall ratio stands at about 3.6 to one, as shown in Table 1.

Box 2 summarizes the Trump administration’s 2019 claimed 150 completed regulatory eliminations or reductions by agency, showing significant (59) and other/non-significant (91) components, along with a breakdown of the claimed \$13 billion in present value cost savings for fiscal year 2019.<sup>97</sup> As Box 2 shows, the Department of Health and Human Services issued the most claimed significant deregulatory rules (11) and led in claimed cost savings (\$11.4 billion); Veterans Affairs and the EPA account for most of the cost added. While overall the “no net new costs” directive is apparently being met given the body of agency activity surveyed by OMB, it appears to not neces-

## Box 2. Completed EO 13771 Deregulatory (Significant and other) Actions, Regulatory Actions, and Claimed Cost Savings, FY2018

|   | Deregulatory Actions |             |           | Regulatory Actions | Present Value Savings |
|---|----------------------|-------------|-----------|--------------------|-----------------------|
|   | Total                | Significant | Other     |                    |                       |
| Executive Department/Agency                   | 150                  | 61          | 89        | 35                 | (\$13,470.9)          |
| Dept. of Agriculture                          | 13                   | 5           | 8         |                    | \$(2,152.0)           |
| Dept. of Commerce                             | 18                   | 0           | 18        |                    | \$(73.2)              |
| Dept. of Defense                              | 4                    | 2           | 2         |                    | \$(21.5)              |
| Dept. of Education                            | 4                    | 2           | 2         |                    | \$(3,081.5)           |
| Dept. of Energy                               | 5                    | 2           | 3         |                    | \$(305.9)             |
| Dept. of Health and Human Services            | 14                   | 11          | 3         | 13                 | \$(11,400.7)          |
| Dept. of Homeland Security                    | 11                   | 4           | 7         | 3                  | \$(781.1)             |
| Housing and Urban Development                 | 2                    | 2           | 0         | 1                  | \$(365.0)             |
| Dept. of Interior                             | 18                   | 4           | 14        |                    | \$(1,452.8)           |
| Dept. of Justice                              | 1                    | 0           | 1         | 1                  | \$20.8                |
| Dept. of Labor                                | 8                    | 8           | 0         | 2                  | \$(7,959.3)           |
| Dept. of Transportation                       | 23                   | 8           | 15        | 4                  | \$(2,319.2)           |
| Dept. of the Treasury                         | 4                    | 3           | 1         | 1                  | \$61.7                |
| Veterans' Affairs                             | 3                    | 1           | 2         | 3                  | \$8,129.9             |
| Environmental Protection Agency               | 18                   | 4           | 14        | 6                  | \$8,392.4             |
| DoD/GSA/NASA (Federal Acquisition Regulation) | 1                    | 1           | 0         | 1                  | \$(8.8)               |
| Office of Personnel Management                | 1                    | 1           | 0         |                    |                       |
| Small Business Administration                 | 1                    | 1           | 0         |                    | \$(16.3)              |
| U.S. Agency for International Development     | 1                    | 0           | 1         |                    | \$(138.50)            |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                                  | <b>150</b>           | <b>59</b>   | <b>91</b> | <b>35</b>          | <b>\$(13,471.0)</b>   |

Source: White House OMB, Regulatory Reform Results for Fiscal Year 2019, <https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaEO13771>.

sarily be happening by individual agency in a given year. As noted, deregulatory campaigns take years.

Again, there are ample critiques of the reality of the claimed cost reductions, of their effect on the economy, of their neglect of benefits,<sup>98</sup> and charges of “taking exaggerated credit for small reductions.”<sup>99</sup> But, as then-acting OIRA Director Dominic Mancini stated in 2017, “EO 13771 deregulatory actions are not limited to those defined as significant under EO 12866 or OMB’s *Final Bulletin on Good Guidance Practices*.”<sup>100</sup> Nonsignificant deregulatory rules issued may contribute to cost savings. Additionally,

there have been eliminations beyond what the White House took credit for, such as with guidance documents and independent agency streamlining. Details on precisely what the rules are from each agency, the full list—of 150 deregulatory (59 significant and 91 nonsignificant) and 35 regulatory actions—is provided in OMB’s “Regulatory Reform Report: Completed Actions for Fiscal Year 2019.”<sup>101</sup>

Regarding the net zero “regulatory budget,” we noted that OMB claims agencies have achieved \$50.9 billion in savings over the past three fiscal years.<sup>102</sup> The White House claims to anticipate additional savings in FY

2020, topping another \$51.6 billion, with the Department of Transportation and the EPA to contribute the vast bulk of cost reductions, and the Department of Homeland Security adding the most cost.<sup>103</sup> As it happens, the savings goal of \$18 billion for 2019 was not met.<sup>104</sup> Still, as seen below, savings would total roughly \$100 billion if the new goals are met (the individualized yearly annual reports depict slightly less savings, about \$45 billion, than OMB claims now).<sup>105</sup>

- FY 2017 savings: \$8.148 billion<sup>106</sup>
- FY 2018 savings: \$23.432 billion<sup>107</sup>
- FY 2019 savings: \$13.471 billion<sup>108</sup>
- FY 2020 savings (anticipated): \$50.949 billion<sup>109</sup>
- Total: \$96.000 billions

The Obama administration's cost picture contrasted sharply with Trump's claimed savings. A November 2017 Heritage Foundation analysis of available information on the Obama regulatory record isolated the major rules listed in the GAO database affecting only the private sector and distinguished between those that were deregulatory and those that were regulatory. The report concluded: "During the Obama years, the nation's regulatory burden increased by more than \$122 billion annually as a result of 284 new 'major' rules."<sup>110</sup>

Each of the prior three fiscal years' rollbacks are detailed in OMB's respective "Regulatory Reform Results" tabulation.<sup>111</sup> Many are obscure, as noted, but there are still prominent examples of rule rollbacks and alterations beyond prominent aforementioned ones such as the Clean Power Plan, Waters of the United States, and other environmental rules.<sup>112</sup> In some instances, independent agencies participated in rollbacks despite not being subject to executive orders. Among much else, notable rules and proposals for rollback have included:

- The Fish and Wildlife Service's "improvements to the implementing regulations of the ESA [Endangered Species Act] designed to increase transparency and effectiveness" regarding critical

habitat designation, unoccupied territory subject to inclusion, and adding or removing species to the endangered list using the "best available scientific and commercial information."<sup>113</sup>

- An EPA and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration withdrawal of the California waiver on vehicle emissions afforded by the Clean Air Act.<sup>114</sup>
- An proposed EPA rule on "strengthening transparency" and limitations on "secret science."<sup>115</sup>
- A Department of Energy final rule withdrawing energy conservation standards for incandescent light bulbs issued under the Obama administration on January 19, 2017.
- A Department of Labor final rule expanding retirement savings options to make it easier for employers to band together and create joint retirement plan options for employees.<sup>116</sup>
- A 2020 proposed rule issued by the White House aimed at updating or modernizing the 1978 National Environmental Policy Act's implementing regulations with respect to environmental reviews of infrastructure projects.<sup>117</sup>
- A final rule from the Treasury Department's Office of the Comptroller of the Currency raising of thresholds for stress testing for banks and savings and loans.<sup>118</sup>
- A final rule from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Reserve, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation raising limits for prohibitions on interlocking managements.<sup>119</sup>

Some proposed rules reductions and streamlining that likely will contribute to one-in, two-out seem economically significant in the normal sense of that term, but do not get characterized as such under the one-in, two-out regime. Examples include:

- Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau notices of proposed rulemaking on relaxing container standards and requirements for wine<sup>120</sup> and distilled spirits;<sup>121</sup>
- Modernization of authorizations for supersonic flights;<sup>122</sup>

- Lessening of restrictions on logging in federal forests put in place during the Clinton administration;<sup>123</sup> and
- The Department of Housing and Urban Development’s proposed rule to “amend HUD’s interpretation of the Fair Housing Act’s disparate impact standard to better reflect” Supreme Court interpretation and address the abuse of such claims with respect to neutral policies.<sup>124</sup>

Notably, treaties are not normally considered regulation, yet relevant in the current context but not counted are savings from withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement.<sup>125</sup>

As the OMB’s own breakdown of specific regulations and rollbacks makes clear, regulations are still being added in the two-for-one era. While some rules are intended to cut or streamline, overarching regulatory regimes exist apart from any president and cannot be undone by one.

*Sixth*, the Trump administration has arguably taken more steps than any predecessor to address the proliferation of significant guidance documents and other sub-regulatory decrees and “regulatory dark matter” that can have regulatory effect.<sup>126</sup> The most prominent to this point had been President George W. Bush’s Executive Order 13422, which subjected significant guidance to OMB review,<sup>127</sup> and his administration’s 2007 OMB Good Guidance Practices memorandum.<sup>128</sup> Trump’s initial executive orders and directives encompassed not just “significant regulatory actions,” but significant guidance on a case-by-case basis.<sup>129</sup> Meanwhile, agencies have revoked guidance and directives that were not included among the proclaimed regulatory reductions.<sup>130</sup> Continued emphasis on guidance documents is important since agencies discouraged from issuing rules may rely more heavily on such sub-regulatory guidance. Addressing guidance more explicitly can also be important for reckoning with the diminishing returns of the two-for-one program.

In 2019, two prominent developments happened at the White House level. April 11 brought an update of a 20-year-old OMB

memo to agencies called “Guidance on Compliance with the Congressional Review Act.”<sup>131</sup> The April 2019 OMB memo reinforced the ignored reality that guidance documents are “rules” and underscored the ignored legal obligations agencies have to send new rules and guidance to both Congress and the GAO before they can take effect, and to ensure that rule status—whether they are major or not—gets formally established before rules are published and considered binding. The level of compliance with these important directives on disclosure and accountability remains unclear, although it is the case that final rule counts dropped substantially in 2019, which could signify some positive effect.<sup>132</sup>

The most significant step in addressing guidance document abuse was the Trump administration’s issuance in October 2019 of two new executive orders (among those listed earlier in Box 1).

- Executive Order 13891, Promoting the Rule of Law through Improved Agency Guidance Documents, October 9, 2019.<sup>133</sup>
- Executive Order 13892, Promoting the Rule of Law through Transparency and Fairness in Civil Administrative Enforcement and Adjudication, October 9, 2019.<sup>134</sup>

Executive Order 13891, “Improved Agency Guidance Documents,” seeks to enable a now-lacking infrastructure for disclosure of guidance documents by creating a “single, searchable, indexed database” at every executive branch agency. Creating those indexes will be streamlined at the outset by an agencies-wide rescission of guidance that “should no longer be in effect.” The order discusses actively “rescinding” guidance documents, but those not added to the database would be void regardless. Where existing guidance is retained or new guidance is issued, its nonbinding nature shall be affirmed. It also required the development of procedures for the public to petition for revocation or alteration.

For the subset of “significant guidance documents,” there are further requirements. These are:

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two-for-one era.***

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- New processes for public notice and comment (subject to “good cause” waiver);
- Public responses from agencies before significant guidance documents are finalized;
- Signoff on significant guidance by a presidentially appointed official; and
- OIRA review under Executive Order 12866 to affirm benefits justify costs (as well as adherence to other regulatory oversight executive orders in effect).

These requirements were followed up on by an implementation memo aimed at clarifying and reinforcing agencies’ duties and compliance.<sup>135</sup> The risk now is that agencies undermine the April 2019 OMB order and Trump’s executive orders on guidance deliberately or simply through disregard.<sup>136</sup>

Like the one-in, two-out order, the new guidance orders have their detractors. The Center for Progressive Reform complained of the “transparency and fairness” order that “Rather than solving a real problem ... seems more focused on creating a myth that agencies are running around punishing companies with arbitrary enforcement actions. That just doesn’t happen in reality.”<sup>137</sup> The bipartisan Administrative Conference of the United States would differ on that score.<sup>138</sup> Yet, it should not be surprising that proponents of stricter regulations might seek to use restrictions on guidance to target guidance intended to lessen regulatory burdens.<sup>139</sup>

Agencies have housed regulatory reform “task forces” since early in the Trump administration, and they are now charged with revising rulemaking and guidance procedures and publishing them under the new executive order. Apart from the White House guidance executive orders, some agencies have taken steps individually. For example, the Department of Transportation took initiative by building on Trump’s initial executive orders on regulatory streamlining with what has been called a “rule on rules,” addressing processes and transparency for rules, guid-

ance, enforcement, and due process.<sup>140</sup> While Trump’s executive orders can be revoked by a new president, this final rule incorporating some of the principles presents hurdles (not insurmountable, of course) to immediate rollback since the benefits of transparency and accountability would have to be denied. To a less formal but still significant extent, in moves that will likely incorporate guidance, bodies like the Department of Transportation<sup>141</sup> and the Environmental Protection Agency maintain their own running online tallies to provide up-to-date public information.<sup>142</sup> Relatedly, the FCC, though as an independent agency not bound by any Trump executive order, issued a January 2020 white paper enumerating steps taken on “Eliminating and Modernizing Outdated Regulations.”<sup>143</sup>

While regulatory reform legislation in general faces substantial barriers in both the House and Senate, guidance reform is an area with bipartisan appeal, especially given recognition by the Administrative Conference of the United States of the potential for abuse and misunderstandings surrounding guidance documents. Measures like the Guidance out of Darkness Act, sponsored in the 116th Congress by Sen. Ron Johnson (R-WI) and Rep. Mark Walker (R-NC), could conceivably gain traction in coming years.<sup>144</sup> Unlike the one-in, two-out order likely to be revoked by a future Democratic president, the attention to guidance documents and their proliferation can amount to a real legacy for the Trump administration. This development can inform the broader goal of Article 1 Restoration in the future. The Trump effort can continue to help eliminate, better classify, disclose, streamline, and check guidance as well as traditional rulemaking and regulations.

In the next section, however, we look at expansion of or threatened regulations of Trump’s own making, increases in burdens or restrictions of liberty that are not attributable to the preexisting administrative state that Trump inherited.