

antitrust as a tool for remaking the economy in the idealized image of central planners represents a serious impediment to free competitive enterprise and entrepreneurship, and risks hindering frontier sectors not only domestically, but globally.

More probable than purported anti-competitive abuses on the part of private firms operating in voluntary market institutions is that coercive regulation will preclude new, unseen, or unpredictable avenues of competitive response. Scholars have documented the high social costs to innovation that accompany antitrust intervention in new, rapidly evolving markets. Potential remedies for such harmful intervention should seek to minimize error costs—the risk of improperly condemning as anticompetitive conduct that is actually beneficial—include heightening the standard of proof of anticompetitive effects, limiting damage awards in antitrust suits, and limiting the standing of companies to bring suits against their rivals.

Overzealous intervention in frontier sectors will likely preempt entire categories of future entrepreneurship, innovation, and wealth creation. Owing to progressivism and its belief in centralized—rather than dispersed—expertise, property rights in frontier sectors, network industries, and vast global “commons” such as spectrum remain poorly understood. It will be catastrophic for entrepreneurship and wealth creation—and consumer protection—if governments worldwide continue to steer, while markets merely row.

Antitrust and regulatory interventionism in the name of consumer welfare should be employed only with extreme caution and skepticism. Political failures, we contend, occur far more frequently than alleged “market failures,” which are in reality often simply failures to allow markets to emerge and evolve. We include the following selection of papers and writings dating back over two decades that demonstrate how government intervention tends to hinder consumer welfare.

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