UNITED STATES COURT **PPEALS** FOR DISTRICT OF COLUMN CIRCUIT UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT MAR 31 2014 2 3 RECEIVED 5 JACQUELINE HALBIG, ET AL., 6 Appellants, 7 No. 14-5018 v. 8 KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS U.S. 9 SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL., 10 11 Appellees. 12 Tuesday, March 25, 2014 13 Washington, D.C. 14 The above-entitled matter came on for oral 15 argument pursuant to notice. 16 BEFORE: 17 CIRCUIT JUDGE GRIFFITH, AND SENIOR CIRCUIT 18 JUDGES EDWARDS AND RANDOLPH 19 APPEARANCES: 20 ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS: 21 22 MICHAEL A. CARVIN, ESQ. 23 ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLEES: 24 STUART F. DELERY, ESQ. 25 Deposition Services, Inc. 12321 Middlebrook Road, Suite 210 Germantown, MD 20874 Tel: (301) 881-3344 Fax: (301) 881-3338

info@DepositionServices.com www.DepositionServices.com



CONTENTS

ORAL	ARGUMENT OF:	PAC	<u>E</u>
	Michael A. Carvin, Esq. On Behalf of the Appellants	3;	69
	Stuart F. Delery, Esq. On Behalf of the Appellees	3	36

PROCEEDINGS

THE CLERK: Case number 14-5018, Jacqueline Halbig
t al., Appellants v. Kathleen Sebelius, in her official
apacity as U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services, et
dl. Mr. Carvin for the Appellants; Mr. Delery for the
appellees.

JUDGE GRIFFITH: So, I guess this is the group that couldn't get into First Street this morning, is that -- okay. Good morning.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL A. CARVIN, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS

MR. CARVIN: Good morning. Michael Carvin for the Appellants. This is a very straight-forward statutory construction case where I think the plain language of the statute dictates the result. And the only two provisions of the Act explaining which insurance exchanges are eligible for the federal subsidies, it states quite clearly that the --

JUDGE GRIFFITH: Can we get to a threshold issue here. And now, is it pronounced Mr. Klemencic?

MR. CARVIN: Klemencic, yes.

JUDGE GRIFFITH: Klemencic. Does he have an adequate remedy in a tax refund suit?

MR. CARVIN: No, he doesn't, for the same reason he didn't have an adequate remedy in NFIB. The Court in NFIB could have said to him well, just pay the penalty and come

back in a couple of years and contest it then, but they didn't, what they said was because the AIA doesn't apply that the ban on pre-enforcement suits, pre-enforcement challenges to the collection of taxes is not applicable. I don't even think that the Government doesn't argue that the AIA applies, and therefore it can't be that equitable principles foreclose them because otherwise the AIA would be a non-entity, it wouldn't mean anything. Thirdly, under the basic principles of Sackett v. EPA, Abbott Labs, Mr. Klemencic would be facing the dilemma of either having to pay a penalty or conforming his behavior to what he considers an illegal command. And the entire point of pre-enforcement review is to make sure that Plaintiffs don't have to face that Hobson's choice.

JUDGE GRIFFITH: Okay.

MR. CARVIN: And then to return to the merits, if I could. The language in the provisions defining the remedies is relatively straight-forward, and indeed as clear as could possibly be, you need to make a purchase on an exchange established by the state under Section 1311, so it clearly does not include purchases on exchanges established by HHS under Section 1321. The Government can't offer any rational explanation of why the subsidy provision says precisely the opposite of what they contend is the rule, why would they exclude HHS. Then they make this argument that it's sort of an odd place to put the restriction on the exchanges, but it's

not th	nat at	all,	it's	not a	an e	elephar	nt i	n a	mouse	hole.	Again
these	restr	iction	ıs are	in t	the	only t	two j	prov	risions	that	define
and li	imit t	he kin	id of	purch	hase	s that	t ar	e su	ıbject	to	

JUDGE GRIFFITH: Does our precedent allow us to conduct a Chevron I analysis by looking at the text alone?

Doesn't Sierra Club, suggest, wouldn't suggest, say that we can't arrive at the decision whether the text is clear by simply looking at the text, we have to look at structure, purpose, legislative history, is that the analysis we're supposed to follow here?

MR. CARVIN: Chevron I is, has Congress spoken -JUDGE GRIFFITH: Right.

MR. CARVIN: -- precisely to the question at issue?

If the statutory language is completely unambiguous then that should be the end of the matter, but I don't want you not to look at the structure of context, and I want you very much to look at the structure of context. The context, the first point I was making is this is the provision that deals with the precise question at issue, are these subsidies available? Everyone agrees that purchases that are not made on exchanges are not subject to the federal subsidies, well, the only reason we know that is because of precisely the same provisions I'm pointing to. The Government agrees that if you buy insurance off the exchange you can't get a subsidy, but the only reason we know that, again, is these two provisions.

The context, if you will, is were they treating the word
stayed as a synonym for all exchanges? Let's look at the
context. Throughout the Act they use phrases like exchange
under the Act when they're trying to get at both kinds of
exchanges; they use the word exchange; in 36B itself, the
subsidy provision, it recognizes that there's two kinds of
exchanges, 1311 exchanges and 1321 exchanges, so I'm not
running from the context, I think it's very much
JUDGE RANDOLPH: You're referring to the reporting
requirement?
MR. CARVIN: Okay. Yes.
JUDGE RANDOLPH: I mean, when you say that if
MR. CARVIN: Yes.
JUDGE RANDOLPH: 36B, yes.
MR. CARVIN: Right.
JUDGE RANDOLPH: But that wasn't part of the
statute, of the Affordable Care Act, was it? That was added
afterwards?
MR. CARVIN: That was added by HCERA, that's
correct.
JUDGE RANDOLPH: Right.

23

24

25

MR. CARVIN: And my only point is it shows a general congressional awareness, I'm not attaching a lot of significance to otherwise it confirms the obvious, which is they knew there was two kinds of exchanges, they knew there

was 1311 exchanges, and they knew there was 1321 exchanges,
one established by the state, one established by the federal
government, and yet when they sat down and said where are
subsidies available they limited it to those established by
the state under Section 1311.

JUDGE EDWARDS: Well, let me raise some questions, if I can. I have parsed as carefully as I can through the legislative history, and anything that indicates a purpose of Congress, individual mandate is one of the critical prongs of the statute, I can't find anything the statute, legislative history, or purpose to indicate that Congress meant to create a connection between state-created exchanges, the availability of subsidies, and the enforcement of individual mandates. You argue that these have these provisions as they do because it's an incentive for the states to set up exchanges to ensure that their citizens will receive a subsidy, is that your argument?

MR. CARVIN: Sure. In other words, they conditioned --

JUDGE EDWARDS: Is there something to indicate that that's what they intended to do, other than you asserting it?

MR. CARVIN: There's three things. First of all we know they did it for the same reason they know they conditioned Medicaid --

JUDGE EDWARDS: No, no, no, is there something --

2	JUDGE EDWARDS: in the language or legislative
3	history that says they meant to set up the statute this way as
4	an incentive to encourage states to set up exchanges?
5	MR. CARVIN: There is three things, all of which are
6	the same as Medicaid. One, they limited the subsidies to
7	situations where the state had established the exchange.
8	JUDGE EDWARDS: You're right. I mean
9	MR. CARVIN: No, but number two
10	JUDGE EDWARDS: your proposition simply assumes
11	the answer to the question, so that one is gone. What's the
12	next one?
13	MR. CARVIN: They said you shall set up exchanges
14	JUDGE EDWARDS: Yes.
15	MR. CARVIN: it commands it, so what's the
16	penalty if you don't adhere to the governmental command? The
17	penalty is you don't get the subsidies. So, we know very much
18	that they wanted state
19	JUDGE EDWARDS: Who's the you don't get the subsidy?
20	MR. CARVIN: I'm sorry?
21	JUDGE EDWARDS: Who is the you?
22	MR. CARVIN: The people in the state.
23	JUDGE EDWARDS: The people in the state. Now,
24	you
25	MR. CARVIN: Correct.

MR. CARVIN: Yes.

25

1	JUDGE EDWARDS: are representing people, as I
2	understand it, who you claim in large numbers, both employers
3	and individuals who neither want the employer assessment, nor
4	the mandate, nor the subsidy because it will invoke the
5	individual mandate.
6	MR. CARVIN: Correct.
7	JUDGE EDWARDS: So, how can you logically argue that
8	states have an incentive to set up exchanges if large numbers
9	of people in the state don't want them?
10	MR. CARVIN: I never
11	JUDGE EDWARDS: Under your theory.
12	MR. CARVIN: The theory is they would be getting
13	hundreds of billions of free federal dollars
14	JUDGE EDWARDS: Who would?
15	MR. CARVIN: People in the state.
16	JUDGE EDWARDS: But not the people that you're
17	purportedly representing, large numbers, employers and
18	individuals, you argue want no part of this, so the state has
19	no incentive. If it's a political look, the state has no
20	incentive to set up the exchanges because there are large
21	numbers of voters and supporters who don't want any part of it
22	if your theory is correct.
23	MR. CARVIN: Judge Edwards, we're not asking what my

attitude is about these things, we're asking what the

proponents of the Act theory was --

JUDGE EDWARDS: You're the one --

MR. CARVIN: -- and they did view --

JUDGE EDWARDS: You're the one who is arguing that

Congress did this to create an incentive. When I read that

argument to be very honest with you so you can know where my

concerns are, it seems preposterous. I don't understand how

the states have an incentive to set up an exchange, and

especially where there's evidence to indicate the reason

Congress left it this way as opposed to Medicaid is some

states didn't want to be bothered setting up the exchanges,

and let the Feds do it, what do they care? It had nothing to

do with this is an incentive, this is a carrot for you because

then subsidies will follow because there are lots of people in

the states who don't want the subsidies.

MR. CARVIN: First of all, no one who passed the Act thought that there was a whole lot of people who didn't want their healthcare paid for, that is as atextual and as counterintuitive as is possible. No one thought giving people \$150 billion to go buy valuable health insurance was something that the people would rise up and say don't do this. So, you can't transport whatever my idiosyncratic views are to the proponents of the Act.

JUDGE EDWARDS: Which people are you talking about?

MR. CARVIN: I am talking --

JUDGE EDWARDS: You're talking about the poor

1 people, right?

MR. CARVIN: Well, no, the Government makes the excellent point that it's not just the poor people who would be --

JUDGE EDWARDS: Okay, the people --

MR. CARVIN: -- adversely --

JUDGE EDWARDS: -- the people who would benefit from the subsidy. We don't know, are the numbers equal, the people who would and would not?

MR. CARVIN: I'm sorry, yes, the -- obviously, anyone who gets the check who is not in the situation of Klemencic, but we're not talking about those people either, we're talking about states who are being told you can either have a very valuable benefit provided to you or not. If you're going to articulate the theory that this is not a valuable benefit, then the Government's purpose argument goes away, because then there is no purpose in distributing these benefits because Congress didn't care if these subsidies were there. But their argument is Congress was so devoted to distributing these subsidies as widely as possible you are to ignore the plain language in the subsidy provision that conditions those subsidies.

JUDGE EDWARDS: So, here's the problem --

MR. CARVIN: So, it's not --

JUDGE EDWARDS: -- here's the problem I'm having,

1	Counselor, as fa	r as I can see no o	one understoo	od what you're
	11	he time this bill v		
3	Medicaid let	me finish my quest:	ion if I can	

MR. CARVIN: Sure.

JUDGE EDWARDS: -- because this is a point that just leaps out --

MR. CARVIN: Sure.

JUDGE EDWARDS: -- it's so obvious, no one understood this, no one assumed that this was the effect of the Act, that is you're giving the states as with respect to Medicaid an opportunity to gut a benefit provision. And this is a critical provision, Medicaid, Congress knew how to do it if they wanted to, they said you pick it or not, and if you don't we understand, so be it. No one assumed that if you choose not to create an exchange because you don't want to be bothered with it you'll effectively gut the statute. I mean, what in your Amicus brief says hey, that's why we're here, we want to gut the statute.

MR. CARVIN: Terrific.

JUDGE EDWARDS: Congress doesn't talk about something like that if that's what their purpose is, gut the statute provision, hello, where's that coming from?

MR. CARVIN: Congress talked about the consequences of the state turning down the subsidies here as much as they talked about the consequences of them turning down Medicaid.

1 There's not a scintilla of legislative history --

JUDGE EDWARDS: The Medicaid provision is explicit on its face about the gutting possibility, that's not clear here.

MR. CARVIN: That is completely untrue.

JUDGE EDWARDS: You have a provision that can be read either the states don't want to be bothered, let the Feds set up the exchange; there's no language to indicate that the failure of the state to do it will effectively gut the statute.

MR. CARVIN: May I clarify the Medicaid provision?

The Medicaid provision doesn't say anything about your aid is condition, all it does is add an additional eligibility criteria to the adducent ones, it said you must go to 133 percent, it doesn't say if you don't take this deal. They point to 1396c as somehow putting the states on notice, but if you read 1396c it has nothing to do with whether or not turning it down you lose your Medicaid eligibility, it's all about after you've accepted the deal if you get in a fight with HHS. It says you can lose your Medicaid funds if the plan has been so changed that it no longer complies with the provisions, and it says that in the administration of the plan there's a failure to comply substantially with the Act. So, it has nothing to do with putting states on notice that if they say, if they don't satisfy the eligibility criteria they

	14
1	are not satisfied, it is precisely parallel in the statute.
2	1396c, by the way, was not added by the Affordable Care Act,
3	so no, you have precisely the same
4	JUDGE GRIFFITH: So, Sierra Club, if we follow the
5	reasoning of Sierra Club we're supposed to look at legislative
6	history. Is there anything in the legislative history, any
7	floor statements, any committee reports that you can point us
8	to that show that this was on the mind of Congress? In fact,
9	is anyone making this point before Professors Adler and Cannor
10	come up with it?
11	MR. CARVIN: Yes.
12	JUDGE GRIFFITH: Who, where, when? And not Chairmar
13	Baucus, sorry, you've over-read that one, so, but that, that
14	doesn't persuade me, but others.
15	MR. CARVIN: Professor Jost made exactly the
16	proposal, a very influential comment, the Health Committee,
17	the other committee that was looking at this Act, conditioned
18	subsidies on them making
19	JUDGE GRIFFITH: Which state does Professor Jost
20	represent?
21	MR. CARVIN: Again, if we're talking about
22	representatives on the floor I have
23	JUDGE GRIFFITH: I mean, Sierra Club says look at

25 MR. CARVIN: Yes.

legislative history.

23

24

1	JUDGE GRIFFITH: There's a traditional way to go
2	about doing that, and it's committee reports and floor
3	statements, right?
4	MR. CARVIN: Yes.
5	JUDGE GRIFFITH: That's what we
6	MR. CARVIN: I was getting to the Help
7	JUDGE GRIFFITH: Yes. Okay. I'm sorry. Sorry.
8	MR. CARVIN: the Help Committee.
9	JUDGE GRIFFITH: Sorry. Yes.
10	MR. CARVIN: The bill there, conditioned subsidies
11	on the states making certain insurance reforms.
12	JUDGE GRIFFITH: That didn't make it into law, did
13	it?
14	MR. CARVIN: No, but I thought you were saying
15	that well, I think what
16	JUDGE RANDOLPH: Yes, they did that, and then, but
17	they said that that would, they deny subsidies unless the
18	state set up in exchange, and the denial would be for four
19	years, right?
20	MR. CARVIN: That was one part of it, but the
21	second
22	JUDGE RANDOLPH: Yes.
23	MR. CARVIN: part, Judge Randolph, was they would
24	be denied subsidies forever unless they applied the employer
25	mandate to state and local government

1 JUDGE RANDOLPH: Right. 2 MR. CARVIN: So, it's a different condition, and --There's a statute in the Internal 3 JUDGE RANDOLPH: Revenue Code right near where this one is found, and it's 26 4 5 U.S.C. Section 35 --6 MR. CARVIN: Right. JUDGE RANDOLPH: -- which is a healthcare subsidy 7 8 provision --9 Right. MR. CARVIN: 10 JUDGE RANDOLPH: -- but it was limited to people who 11 lost their jobs to manufacturing overseas --12 MR. CARVIN: Right. 13 JUDGE RANDOLPH: -- or lost their pensions in the 14 pension crash. I've read that statute, that statute reads 15 almost identically to the statute we, 36B, the one that you're 16 arguing about, and it's clear as a bell there that the states 17 don't, the state residents, citizens don't get any subsidies, 18 I think it was 72 percent, to pay for their healthcare unless 19 the state goes through a whole bunch of hoops and enacts a bunch of different laws, and so on and so forth, and if the 20 21 state doesn't do it then the people don't get the money. 22 MR. CARVIN: Right. 23 JUDGE RANDOLPH: Yes. 24 MR. CARVIN: And they put that, they put that --

JUDGE RANDOLPH:

So, they copied -- I mean, it's a

23

24

1	typical drafting thing in Congress, if you've already done it
2	once what you do is you take that provision and you copy it
3	into the subsidy provision of the Affordable Care Act, I mean,
4	it's clear that's what happened.
5	MR. CARVIN: And two things
6	JUDGE RANDOLPH: They used the same terms, coverage
7	month, eligible individual, so on and so forth.
8	MR. CARVIN: That's exactly right. The condition is
9	contained in a section called coverage month. I think it's
LO	very relevant that the principle sponsor of that was Senator
.1	Baucus, so it wasn't just
L2	JUDGE RANDOLPH: Right.
L3	MR. CARVIN: a coincidence, it was the same
L4	people drafting the Finance Committee thing who had a clear
L5	model for all of this showing that, and again, I don't think
L6	there was a whole lot of
L7	JUDGE EDWARDS: How did all the states miss this?
L 8	MR. CARVIN: None of them
L9	JUDGE EDWARDS: They didn't miss the Medicare
20	condition, they challenged it as unconstitutional, they knew
21	exactly what was intended there, no state, and indeed one of
22	the brief's points is that no state made the equation that the

availability of subsidies was a factor in deciding whether to

MR. CARVIN: They couldn't --25

create an exchange. No one.

JUDGE EDWARDS: This came out of the blue, I mean, you know, it's your job as an attorney, someone figure out a strange argument and let's run with it, we can find this language here and it'll -- as your Amicus says it'll gut the statute.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: I hate to --

MR. CARVIN: They couldn't --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: -- contradict my distinguished colleague, but it was widely known that unless the states set up an exchange they weren't going to get subsidies for their citizens. And in fact, there was an editorial in *Investor's Business Daily* in September of 2011 that pointed that out, and the Texas Congressmen knew it, they sent a letter to Speaker Pelosi complaining about it, I mean, it was clear.

MR. CARVIN: Thirty-five Senators opposed the IRS rule on the grounds, 35 members of Congress opposed it on the grounds that it was not compliant with law. They couldn't have sued under NFIB because it didn't become effective until 2013, that was the date in which the states had to opt to make the decision, and if --

JUDGE EDWARDS: I'm asking what was the evidence, and I think my respected colleague has not addressed it either, there was no evidence at the time this bill was passed that this was the consequence.

MR. CARVIN: Your Honor --

1 JUDGE EDWARDS: No one assumed this. No one. Something like this doesn't hide away and then people all of a 3 sudden oh, my goodness, look what we have, no one assumed as with respect to Medicaid that there was this connection here 4 5 and that you could effectively gut the statute. And the other 6 reading there was also plenty of evidence out there that the, 7 in fact, I think folks on your side in one of the cases 8 commented on look how nice Congress was, they allowed the states to, you know, take the trouble to set up an exchange, 9 10 or let the Feds do it, either way, never making the connection 11 that it had anything to do with the availability of subsidies. 12 MR. CARVIN: That makes my point, Judge Edwards. 13 Everyone knew there was a condition in Medicaid. 14 a scintilla of legislative history confirming that truism, 15

Everyone knew there was a condition in Medicaid. There's not a scintilla of legislative history confirming that truism, why, because people can read statutes, and if a statute says you don't get Medicaid unless you increase your eligibility everyone knows it, they don't need letters from Senators to Governors. And the Court has consistently instructed us that we don't psychoanalyze what members of Congress thought, we look at what Congress enacted, and if --

JUDGE EDWARDS: You look at the whole statute.

MR. CARVIN: That's true, and let's say some --

JUDGE EDWARDS: The whole statute.

MR. CARVIN: Let's --

JUDGE EDWARDS: What information you have to

21

16

17

18

19

20

_ _

22

23

24

25

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

require, whether there are other provisions that work differently, obviously work differently, the Medicaid provision is not the same as this provision.

MR. CARVIN: It is, except it's more draconian consequences if the states says no, and if a state had said no and some litigant had come into court and said you know what, this is terrible in terms of the consequences, we've just eliminated the most important social welfare program in the last 50 years, so we want you to read the condition out of the statute, and we point out that there was not legislative history, no court would take that argument seriously. NFIB struck down that provision, it was obliged to give it a savings construction and no one on the court suggested that was remotely plausible, that is because we look at what the statute says, what was enacted by Congress, and if there's no reason to interpret the language differently than what it says because there is no absurdities as there concededly is not here, that is the end of the judicial law. We don't go around asking how much awareness there was, particularly in a context, let's face it, they had six days to debate this in the Senate.

JUDGE EDWARDS: I think the point is there are absurdities here.

MR. CARVIN: Excuse me?

JUDGE EDWARDS: I think there are absurdities here.

24

24

25

MR. CARVIN: Which ones. And the one they --

JUDGE EDWARDS: There are absurdities --

MR. CARVIN: -- point to is the qualified individual, okay? They say look, it says you have to be, reside in the state that established the exchange, and they say that's absurd because that would mean nobody could reside on federal exchanges, but we know that's not a consequence of our interpretation of 36B, how do we know that, because the Government agrees. If this Court agrees that 36 --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: That's not even an anomaly any more because they passed a regulation that nobody's challenged that defines qualified individuals, anybody on any exchange. So, it's a non-issue, it's not an anomaly, it's certainly not an absurdity. There's a regulation out there that takes care of the problem, and nobody's challenged it, unlike this regulation.

MR. CARVIN: And I could just elaborate on that point. Mr. Delery is not going to stand up here and tell you that if you rule our way on 36B that they will be obliged to revise that regulation and exclude everybody from federal exchanges. Even more importantly, our argument on why it doesn't create absurdity is because it only says you need to be a qualified individual with respect to an exchange, and an exchange is defined in the Act as an exchange under 1311, i.e. state exchanges. So, this requirement only applies to state

exchanges. Please read their opposition brief, they don't dispute that in any way, shape, or form because they know that this requirement only applies to state exchanges because they're not going to suggest this absurd result. So, what they're trying to do is take a tendentious litigation position on the qualified individual provision so they can create this fake absurdity and then transport that absurdity and that rewriting of the language to 36B where it is conceded that there is no absurdity.

In terms of the other anomalies of the Act, they simply don't exist. They say the Medicaid maintenance of effort requirement, which requires you to maintain your Medicaid standards until there's a state established exchange creates some kind of absurdity, no, the Government itself says the purpose of that is to freeze all Medicaid payments until the subsidies from the ACA come in to replace them. Well, if we are correct that the subsidies don't exist on the state exchanges that simply means they're going to freeze --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: No, on the federal exchanges.

MR. CARVIN: I'm sorry. Yes. Sorry. That they're going to freeze those until they create a state exchange, in other words, precisely the reason that they give, plus which, of course, it gives the states another incentive to create the state exchanges, so in that way they could then modify their Medicaid, so there's no absurdity there. They point out the

reporting requirements in 36B(f)(3), which as Judge Randolph pointed out earlier came from the House were stuck into this provision, which is why there's a bit of a disconnect between the title of the provision and the absolute language of the provision, and 36B(f)(3) says that, explicitly recognizes that there's a difference between 1311 and 1321 exchanges, so it completely refutes their notion that somehow Congress thought state was a synonym for 1321 federal exchanges. They say it's odd that --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: The notice of proposed rule-making also recognized that, if you look at the notice of rule writ making it says we interpret established by a state pursuant to 1311 to mean established by the federal government pursuant to Section 1321, that's what the proposed -- we're reviewing a rule here, and that's the notice of proposed rule-making.

MR. CARVIN: That is the Government's position, it's also the Government's position on the funding mechanism. The funding mechanism says it only goes to exchanges established by the state, well, HHS doesn't draw on those funds for its exchanges because it knows that when the same provision talking about funding says established by the state, that that's what it means, and they didn't want to get cross-wise with Congress when they tried to dip into a fund that was reserved exclusively for the state. So, even the Government doesn't believe their own argument.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

At the end of the day what they're trying to tell you is that it's unreasonable or irrational or not the purpose to limit some states to not have subsidies. I agree. were arguing that there was something in the Act that said these states don't get subsidies they'd have a point, we're not making that argument, we're making the argument that they condition subsidies on the state creating the exchanges, so what they have to argue is that was irrational. But we know it's not irrational for three reasons, that's what they did with Medicaid, they very much wanted state run exchanges. only real incentive for the states to run the exchanges was by conditioning subsidies. The alternative policy under the IRS's re-writing of the rule creates a bizarre circumstance where it's almost impossible to fulfill the Act's purpose of having state run exchanges because it eliminates any tangible incentive for these people to go ahead and adopt the exchanges, so they've created a situation which predicably has resulted in only 14 states doing what Congress clearly wanted 50 states to do, which is to set up their exchanges.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: So, in other words, your argument is a but for the IRS rule it may well have been that the implicit prediction of, quote, Congress that all the states would buy into and set up their own exchanges didn't happen, and the reason it didn't happen is because the IRS rule came in there and the states said there's nothing in it for us now,

I mean, let the federal government do it. Yes.

MR. CARVIN: If the D.C. Government said you get \$100 if you clear the sidewalk in front of your house of snow, or you get \$100 if you don't clear the sidewalk in front of your house of snow, there would be a whole lot of snow on the sidewalks because they have utterly eliminated the incentive to take the desired action, and the same is precisely true here. The calculus of Congress was we will only achieve less than 50 per state participation if states behave in the economically irrational thing of denying hundreds of billions of dollars of free federal money, it's not like Medicaid where they have to chip in about 43 --

JUDGE EDWARDS: What is the advantage, and you keep, your propositions just assume the answer to the issue, which is I don't know what to say, I keep listening to it over and over again, you just assume the answer and then you run with that. Why does it matter who creates the exchange? Now, forget your alleged tie to the subsidy, okay? Forget that.

MR. CARVIN: How do we know it matters to Congress, we know it --

JUDGE EDWARDS: Why does it matter?

MR. CARVIN: Because they said states shall run the exchange, they gave the strong --

JUDGE EDWARDS: And they said and if they don't it'll be done by the Feds.

1 MR. CARVIN: Exactly. But what you --2 JUDGE EDWARDS: They didn't say oh, it's a bad thing 3 it'll be done by the Feds, they said if the states do it, it says a governmental agency or non-profit entity established by 4 5 the state, and HHS will establish the exchange when the state fails to do it, isn't section exchange an entity established 6 7 by a state? 8 MR. CARVIN: Yes, of --9 JUDGE EDWARDS: Isn't that established by the state? 10 MR. CARVIN: They wanted states to run the --11 JUDGE EDWARDS: No, no, no. Isn't there an 12 ambiguity there if you read that language the state shall, and 13 if not, the Feds will, that is an exchange established by the 14 state, can't the Government say that's the way we're 15 interpreting it when you look at the purposes of the Act? MR. CARVIN: No, not at all. You can't interpret 16 17 state to mean federal, you can't interpret north to mean 18 south. They --19 JUDGE EDWARDS: What advantage is there, forget the 20 subsidy, what advantage is there to a state as opposed to the Fed setting up the exchange? Forget the subsidy. 21 22 To get reelected. Do you want to go MR. CARVIN: 23 out and tell your citizens I have just denied you hundreds of 24 billions of --

JUDGE EDWARDS: No, no, no. No, no.

You have to

1	forget the subsidy. See, you keep asserting the proposition
2	in a way that it's the answer to your question. Forget the
3	subsidy. I'm trying to understand, because I've thought about
4	this a lot, your argument makes no sense, who cares who sets
5	up the exchange?
6	JUDGE RANDOLPH: Ben Nelson
7	MR. CARVIN: The enactors of the Act
8	JUDGE RANDOLPH: Ben Nelson cared.
9	JUDGE EDWARDS: Who cares?
10	JUDGE RANDOLPH: Ben Nelson.
11	MR. CARVIN: They couldn't get to 60 unless Ben
12	Nelson said we are not going to have a federally run exchange,
13	we are going to implement basic principles of Federalism and
14	the states are going to run those exchanges or I don't vote
15	for it and it doesn't get passed.
16	JUDGE EDWARDS: Okay. And then what Congress did
17	MR. CARVIN: Now, then what Congress did was
18	JUDGE EDWARDS: to set up a let me give you my
19	question
20	MR. CARVIN: Sure.
21	JUDGE EDWARDS: Then what Congress did
22	MR. CARVIN: Please.
23	JUDGE EDWARDS: forgetting the subsidies is they
24	set up this arrangement.

MR. CARVIN: Yes.

1 JUDGE EDWARDS: The states can do it if you want to 2 do it, if not, we'll do it. 3 MR. CARVIN: It said the states shall do it, and if 4 you don't, we will do it. 5 JUDGE EDWARDS: We will do it. MR. CARVIN: And that tells you that they wanted an 6 7 exchange in the state, but it doesn't -- but they preferred a 8 state run --9 JUDGE EDWARDS: You're not answering my question. 10 Forget the subsidy. 11 MR. CARVIN: I am forgetting it. 12 JUDGE EDWARDS: Who cares? 13 I am forgetting it. MR. CARVIN: 14 JUDGE EDWARDS: Who cares, other than the one person 15 you've -- what difference does it make who sets up the subsidy? There is evidence -- there's no evidence coming from 16 17 the states supporting what you're suggesting, and there is 18 evidence that some states were happy to let the Feds do it, 19 they didn't want to be bothered. MR. CARVIN: 20 If that was true that they were happy 21 to have the Feds do it, and the Feds wanted the states to do 22 it, that means you needed to provide them with a pretty big 23 incentive, and the best and most closely drawn incentive for 24 them to do what they were unwilling to do, but Ben Nelson and

the Act wanted them to do was to say I'll give you hundreds of

billions of dollars to your voters if you do it. Now, if you say no you're going to have to go back to those people of all income strata, and to all those businesses who are adversely affected --

JUDGE EDWARDS: See, the great irony --

MR. CARVIN: -- and you have to tell them --

JUDGE EDWARDS: The great irony in your argument is you're standing there representing the employers and the folks and you claim there are many, many, many of these folks in many, many, many of these states --

MR. CARVIN: I never said that.

JUDGE EDWARDS: -- who want no part of this, and they are voting, too, and then out of the other side of your mouth you're saying well, but this is a great incentive for a state to set up the exchange because they have to go back to those voters, they don't want to give up that money. Well, you're saying there are lots of those voters who want no part of this.

MR. CARVIN: Judge Edwards, with the greatest respect, surely the interpretation of a statute can't turn on what the Plaintiffs think or believe. Sure, if I had a supporter of the Act coming in here --

JUDGE EDWARDS: No, no, I'm just taking you -- MR. CARVIN: No, no.

JUDGE EDWARDS: -- at your word. You start your

PLU

24

25

argument, the crux of your argument is there was an incentive 1 2 for the states to do that. I'm reading stuff really 3 carefully, that argument from day one has made no sense to me 4 whatsoever, given who you're representing, and given the 5 number of people you say you represent, who want no part of this. So, the state acting politically is not clearly going 6 7 to say let's set up an exchange. MR. CARVIN: Judge Edwards, let's assume one of 8 9 two --JUDGE EDWARDS: If Congress gives them an option to 10 11 set it up or not, they're going to say let's not do it because 12 there are a lot of people in the state who don't want any part 13 of it. 14 MR. CARVIN: Okay. There's two propositions, one is 15 the states are reluctant to set up the exchanges, if that's 16 true, then you need a very large incentive to get them to do it. Number two is the state --17 18 JUDGE EDWARDS: Only if it matters. Only if it 19 matters, who does it? They wanted the states to run the 20 MR. CARVIN: 21 exchanges, they said --22 JUDGE EDWARDS: Because? 23 MR. CARVIN: Because they said shall run, because

they needed Ben Nelson's vote to pass the Act, and because --

JUDGE EDWARDS: So, this all --

PLU

24

25

MR. CARVIN: -- it was, it was --1 2 JUDGE EDWARDS: -- comes down to Ben Nelson? 3 MR. CARVIN: It was --4 JUDGE EDWARDS: I'm not getting it. If you take the 5 subsidy out --6 MR. CARVIN: Yes. 7 JUDGE EDWARDS: -- of the equation --MR. CARVIN: Right. Then you get --8 JUDGE EDWARDS: -- and I'm asking, I know I've asked 9 10 this seven times, I'm asking again, take it out. 11 MR. CARVIN: Right. 12 JUDGE EDWARDS: You have a provision that says the 13 state will do it, or the Feds will do it, what difference does 14 it make who does it? Forget the subsidy. 15 MR. CARVIN: Because if you have the Feds running it 16 it is the first step, to quote Senator Nelson, towards a 17 federally run healthcare exchange. We want to ensure that we 18 have state participation. You don't have to speculate about 19 whether Senator Nelson's views prevailed because you can look 20 at the Act, and the Act says two very explicit things, the states shall do it, which is hardly agnostic as to whether or 21 22 not the states will do it; and two, only the states will get 23 money to set up the exchanges, we won't give any money to the

federal exchanges. So, I've never mentioned the word

subsidies, and that's how you know they wanted states to run

exchanges.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: I thought your argument, also, was
rather broader than that, because the pattern, the model, the
system that this sets up is a very familiar one. The Clean
Air Act, The Water Quality Act, I mean, and all of those
provide that if the state doesn't set up a state
implementation plan, the federal government will take it over.
It matters a great deal to the states to have control, but
life's a trade off, and this statute is rather Janus-faced, I
mean, it's looking in about 15 different directions on every
other page, cobbled together, poorly written, but there it is,
and it is modeled, I think, over on 26 U.S.C. Section 35, and
that also conditions subsidies on states enacting laws, and
that's what we're dealing with here is states enacting laws.
And as far as the states are concerned, and we have Amicus
briefs from a number of states that made the trade off that we
think it's more important to preserve our liberty not to have
to engage in, or not to have to buy what the federal
government tells us than it is to have our citizens beholden
to the federal government through subsidies. That's a trade
off a state can make, maybe they'll pay a political price for
it.

MR. CARVIN: And look, all I'm asking you is to give states the option that Congress gave them. The IRS changed the deal, it said --

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

JUDGE EDWARDS: No, no, what you're asking for is, come on, let's put it on the table.

> MR. CARVIN: Sure.

JUDGE EDWARDS: What you're asking for is destroy the individual mandate which guts the statute. You admit that's what this case is about. There's nothing hidden about that, kill this, you kill the individual mandate, and we gut the statute, and we've got what we want. Now, my own personal view since we're expressing some views here is isn't that a political question, shouldn't you be in Congress fighting that fight, but that's what this case is about, gut the statute.

MR. CARVIN: That's the key point, right, Judge Edwards? Let's let Congress figure this out. Congress wrote it this way, if --

JUDGE EDWARDS: No, no, no. Let Congress undo what you say should not be properly there.

MR. CARVIN: If Congress said, as it expressly did in the clearest possible English that subsidies are limited to exchange established by the states under Section 1311, and they don't like that result then all they have to do is change the law. It is --

> JUDGE EDWARDS: That's the question.

MR. CARVIN: No.

JUDGE EDWARDS: That's the question.

MR. CARVIN: I know. And you're saying you --

22

23

24

25

PLU

25

JUDGE EDWARDS: And if there's an ambiguity is an 1 2 agency free to cure the ambiguity? 3 MR. CARVIN: No. JUDGE EDWARDS: No. MR. CARVIN: Not in these circumstances, because of 6 Shinseki. But if I can get back to the major point, if the 7 stakes are so high, the reason the stakes have become so high is because the IRS completely altered the incentives for 8 states when they were making the original decision, and if the 9 stakes are high that is when the Courts should adhere most 10 11 closely to the legislative language because it shouldn't allow agencies to hijack, as the Court just put it in Loving, very 12 13 important economic and politically significant questions. 14 That is when the judiciaries deference to the agency is at 15 zenith, not at its apex. JUDGE RANDOLPH: Can I ask you, I'd like to get your 16 17 view on it, but I'd also like to know your opponent's view. Is a state still free to set up an exchange? 18 19 MR. CARVIN: Yes. 20 JUDGE RANDOLPH: Even though it has to, the statute 21 reads it has to be in effect by January 1st, 2014, can they 22 still set up an exchange? 23 MR. CARVIN: Sure. If you read that provision 24 carefully, the January 1, '14 is the date upon which the HHS

must act, that's what triggers the HHS requirement.

there's no prohibition that they come in after January, '14 that they're somehow stopped, plus which there's a provision in there that says we won't give grants after January 1, 2015, which strongly suggests that they contemplated states coming in after 2015. HHS has taken the position, for example, the two states that are currently on the fence that if they get their act in they can come in. And finally, there would be a very strong --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: So, there's another solution to the so-called gutting of the statute beyond congressional action, and if the IRS rule is vacated, speaking hypothetically, then the 34 states who said it doesn't matter could opt in and set up an exchange and everybody would go away and, you know, there would be no issue.

MR. CARVIN: You won't even need a corrective action.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Right.

MR. CARVIN: We can figure out whether or not I'm right, or, or, and Congress is right that states don't behave economically irrational by denying hundreds of billions of dollars to their voters, it would certainly dramatically change the calculus. If you have to tell your voters I don't want to take on this politically unpopular task of running the exchange, explaining to your voters because I don't want to do that you people making up to \$95,000 a year aren't going to

get a dime in federal subsidies, and you're not going to be able to afford the health insurance that you would if I made a separate decision, I think that will dramatically alter the attitudes of elected officials in those states. Absolutely. Thank you.

JUDGE GRIFFITH: Thank you, Mr. Carvin. Mr. Delery.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF STUART F. DELERY, ESO.

ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLEES

MR. DELERY: Good morning, and may it please the Court. The text and structure of the Affordable Care Act demonstrate that federal tax credits are available to lower the cost of insurance on the 34 federally facilitated exchanges within individual states. The relevant statutory provisions read together as they must be preclude Plaintiff's interpretation, and show that Congress intended a nationwide system to provide affordable healthcare. Plaintiffs' fundamental error is to focus on one phrase in one provision in isolation. The Government's reading --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: It's not one phrase. I've heard that so many times. At one point I counted up the number of references to established by a state pursuant to 1311, just in 36B, and I think that it appears seven times, not just once, do you disagree with that?

MR. DELERY: It does appear several times, Your Honor.

1	JUDGE RANDOLPH: Not several, I said seven.
2	MR. DELERY: Yes. I'm not sure about the exact
3	number
4	JUDGE RANDOLPH: Yes. Yes.
5	MR. DELERY: but I know it is several, multiple.
6	JUDGE RANDOLPH: So, it's not an isolated phrase in
7	the statute.
8	MR. DELERY: Right. So, 36B(a) begins by saying the
9	tax credit shall be allowed in the case of an applicable tax
10	payer, and then the formula calculates the amount of the
11	credit with respect to income level, not based on which
12	exchange. If you look then at two references in the formula
13	in (b)(2)(A) and (c)(2)(A)(I) the phrase says established by
14	the state under 1311, or 42 U.S.C. 18031. So, that provision
15	itself includes a cross-reference straight to the nested
16	exchange requirements in Title 42, but
17	JUDGE GRIFFITH: Well, in this case
18	MR. DELERY: concludes
19	JUDGE GRIFFITH: with West Virginia, Mr.
20	Klemencic is from West Virginia, who established the exchange
21	in West Virginia? Who?
22	MR. DELERY: The Secretary.
23	JUDGE GRIFFITH: The Secretary established the
24	exchange.
25	MR. DELERY: Right.

1	JUDGE GRIFFITH: West Virginia did not establish the
2	exchange.
3	MR. DELERY: That's correct, Your Honor. But under
4	Section
5	JUDGE GRIFFITH: So, if we're parsing this phrase
6	established by the state, right?
7	MR. DELERY: I think the phrase is established by
8	the state under
9	JUDGE GRIFFITH: Under 1311.
10	MR. DELERY: 1311
11	JUDGE GRIFFITH: Yes.
12	MR. DELERY: which is a cross-reference. So, in
13	order to interpret the plain text of that statute you need to
14	go to 1311
15	JUDGE GRIFFITH: Right.
16	MR. DELERY: to see what it says, and that's
17	where the Plaintiffs discovered the importance of context.
18	So, Section 1311 provides that the states shall establish an
19	exchange, as was just discussed. Plaintiffs recognize,
20	however, that that is not the end of the story because states
21	have an option under the framework of the statute.
22	JUDGE GRIFFITH: Well, the question isn't what type
23	of exchange it is, right? I mean, it's an exchange, it can
24	be the question here
25	MP DELEDY. Diaht

1	JUDGE GRIFFITH: is who established it?
2	Apparently that phrase meant a lot to Congress, as Judge
3	Randolph
4	MR. DELERY: Right.
5	JUDGE GRIFFITH: mentioned, seven times, who
6	established it, and by your own admission the Secretary
7	established it.
8	MR. DELERY: Right. I think I have two answers to
9	that, Your Honor, the first is to focus on the language of
10	18041(c)
11	JUDGE GRIFFITH: Right.
12	MR. DELERY: which provides that if a state
13	either elects not to establish its own exchange, or is
14	unable
15	JUDGE RANDOLPH: You know, it would be very helpful,
16	and I found your brief a little confusing, if you used either
17	the sections from the Affordable Care Act
18	MR. DELERY: Sure.
19	JUDGE RANDOLPH: or the sections from the U.S.
20	Code rather than switching back and forth. When you said that
21	I said gee, I don't, okay, you're talking about 1321.
22	MR. DELERY: Right.
23	JUDGE RANDOLPH: Okay.
24	MR. DELERY: I'm happy to do that, Your Honor.
25	JUDGE RANDOLPH: Yes. Okay.

25

can do that.

JUDGE GRIFFITH: Yes. Yes, I vote for that. 1 2 MR. DELERY: It's 1321 --JUDGE GRIFFITH: Yes. 3 4 MR. DELERY: -- and this appears on page 17A of the 5 addendum --6 JUDGE RANDOLPH: Okay. 7 MR. DELERY: -- if that's helpful. So, that if a 8 state is not an electing state, or is unable to establish the 9 exchange, have it operational by the date, which was January 10 1st, then the Secretary shall establish and operate such 11 exchange within the state. And I believe in the prior 12 argument the phrase such exchange was not referenced by the 13 Plaintiffs, they talk about an exchange when in fact the 14 statutory term is such exchange, which refers back to the 15 required exchange under 1311. I think --16 JUDGE RANDOLPH: Well, that can't be the end of it, 17 though, can it? I mean, because if they're establishing the 18 exchange under 1311 then that means the federal government has got to elect state officials, which is rather odd. 19 20 MR. DELERY: Right. 21 JUDGE RANDOLPH: Doesn't 1311 require the election 22 of state officials and someone to administer -- we talk about an exchange, but what we're really talking about is an entity 23

formed under state law, the federal government I don't think

MR. DELERY: I think what these two provisions read together as they must be, Your Honor, mean, is that a state was given the right of first refusal, the first option to establish an exchange, if it either chose not to do so, or was unable to do so then the Secretary would step in and establish such exchange to accomplish the same functions, and I believe that the Plaintiffs can agree on page five --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: But the Secretary is -- excuse me, the Secretary is operating pursuant to Section 1321, which is what you're talking about.

MR. DELERY: Right.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: The states operate pursuant to Section 1311. So, some of the requirements of 1311 apply to the Secretary's establishment of an exchange, but still, is it your submission that the phrase which appears seven times in that statute, established by a state pursuant to Section 1311 means that a federal exchange is established by a state pursuant to 1311? Yes, parse those words for me, and tell me where the interpretive view that you're espousing fits within that language.

MR. DELERY: So, make a couple of points. I think that the basic point is that the exchange under 1311 where a state has not established an exchange, slots into, provides the function of is the substitute for the state's exchange under 1311, provides the same functions, and I believe that

2

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

that is the position that the Plaintiffs agree with in their reply brief on page five. So, what you really have is a nest series of provisions so that --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: But I'm not getting the language, established by the state pursuant to 1311 means as the proposed notice of rule-making, established by the federal government pursuant to Section 1321, I mean, that is a leap. I don't know. That's not interpretation.

So, respectfully, Your Honor, I think MR. DELERY: if you look at the slotting in of the federal exchange you get to this result, and exchange is a defined term under Title One of the Affordable Care Act. Section 36B is in the Internal Revenue Code, exchange established by the state under 1311 is pointing back to the nested exchange provisions in what was titled Title One of the Affordable Care Act, but for purposes of that provision exchange is a defined term, meaning an American health benefit exchange under 1311. So, when the Secretary is directed to establish such exchange, that's such, American health benefit exchange under 1311. Congress is clearly indicating that it wants a system of exchanges nationwide to provide affordable healthcare for all Americans. States have the first opportunity to establish those exchanges under this framework, but if they don't then that same exchange is created by the Secretary.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Yes, we know that. That's not the

25

2.2

- 1 same exchange, you have to agree to that.
- 2 MR. DELERY: For purposes of the operation of the statute it is.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Well, it's not the same exchange because 1311 talks about state officials running it, and state laws being passed, and state budgets being charged with the responsibility with some federal subsidies, so it's not the same thing.

MR. DELERY: Right. Given the definitional terms, however, the point is that the, Your Honor, the Secretary's exchange stands in the shoes of, steps into the place of the defined term.

JUDGE GRIFFITH: I don't get it. As I -- all you're saying to me is, and maybe I'm just not hearing you, is that you're saying under, because of 1311 the Secretary can establish the type of exchange that's created in 1311, but that begs the question, the key language is who establishes the exchange, and you just keep coming back to well, the Secretary establishes it.

MR. DELERY: Well, I think, Your Honor, that the key language is that the --

JUDGE GRIFFITH: The key language is established by the state under 1311.

MR. DELERY: Under 1311. And --

JUDGE GRIFFITH: And it was West Virginia

	ii
1	established, the exchange in West Virginia was it established
2	by the state under 1311?
3	MR. DELERY: That exchange
4	JUDGE GRIFFITH: And the answer is no, it was
5	MR. DELERY: That it's established by the
6	JUDGE GRIFFITH: established by the Secretary
7	MR. DELERY: Yes.
8	JUDGE GRIFFITH: pursuant to 1321 as it
9	references, and it's a type of exchange that you would get
10	under 1311 in terms of the marketplace, but it wasn't
11	established by the state.
12	MR. DELERY: But the further point, Your Honor, I
13	think is, you know, the Secretary, HHS establishes the
14	exchanges
15	JUDGE GRIFFITH: Yes.
16	MR. DELERY: where the state, and operates them
17	where the state does not, but Congress can define terms
18	however it wants, it can set up nested provision however it
19	wants, it's not that unusual.
20	JUDGE GRIFFITH: And Congress did this for
21	territories, right? I think in the case of territories
22	MR. DELERY: Right.
23	JUDGE GRIFFITH: Congress said territories can
24	create these exchanges and they will be treated like a state.
25	They didn't use that language here, why not?

MR. DELERY: I mean, the territory provision was needed because of the differing internal income tax --

JUDGE GRIFFITH: Right, right, right.

MR. DELERY: -- provisions that apply there. Here, I would submit, it's in a different form, but it has the, it reaches the same result, it has the same effect. That is what Congress did. And if you step back to the point about what the goal of the statute was here, I think it's clear from the text of the statute, and from the structure, that the purpose was to provide affordable healthcare to Americans nationwide. It was --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Is that the only purpose? Wasn't there also a purpose to have the states run the exchanges?

MR. DELERY: I think what the statute reflects is a design of cooperative Federalism so that the states would have the first opportunity, certainly, to run the exchanges, but that if they did not the federal government would step in and provide them. That's why the term applicable to the states is that the state could elect to establish an exchange for itself and otherwise the states won't.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Let me give you a proposition and I'd like you to respond to it. This statute, as everybody knows, was kind of a last minute deal, and it never went through the usual legislative process of the Conference Committee, and so on and so forth, but, and there were a lot

of, the statute is filled with a lot of predictions, even the title, and from all reports those predictions have not been borne out, the launch was an unmitigated disaster, as everybody agrees. The costs have gone sky high, even though Congress apparently thought that competition and an open market, free, or a transparent market would drive costs down, and let us suppose that Congress made another prediction, and that prediction was that if we allow subsidies on state exchanges without allowing them on federal exchanges that all the states would line up and buy that deal, and that prediction turned out to be wrong. So, as a narrative of what is going on with the Affordable Care Act where do you disagree?

MR. DELERY: I disagree with several of the first premises, among other things, there are millions of Americans who have been rolled through exchanges for healthcare that they otherwise could not have afforded, or could not access because of pre-existing conditions. And the structure of the Act was to provide an integrated system of reforms that would reform the individual market. So, now insurance companies have to cover people no matter how sick they are, and the structure as designed was to bring otherwise healthy people into the insurance market through a combination of the mandate, as was discussed, and the subsidies, which make them affordable. Without the subsidies on the exchange the

exchanges and the insurance markets won't function, because the sick people will buy the insurance that they're entitled to, otherwise healthy people will not be in the risk pool, the pool, therefore, will be more expensive to insure, premiums will continue to go up, and the cycle will repeat, that's the death spiral that we and other Amici have talked about. Right now millions of Americans have enrolled and are getting the benefit of tax credits which are key to provide this affordable health insurance.

The Plaintiffs' counter-narrative which provides a different purpose --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Well, you left one thing out of the calculation, and that is that Congress acted on the assumption that dangling this carrot in front of the states and the politicians and the governors of the states would lead to the fact that the states themselves would set up exchanges rather than the federal government, and there's some pretty strong evidence of that, because how much was, what was the budget allocated to the federal government to set up exchanges? It was only \$304 million, as I recall, and yet the, at last time I checked it's cost well over \$2 billion, so that the budget allocation, appropriation indicated that there wouldn't be if any federal exchanges.

MR. DELERY: I don't think that that's the case,
Your Honor, either. Certainly there were reports at the time

2.1

1	that states were considering not establishing exchanges, and
2	obviously, the statute provides that flexibility, the term and
3	the title of the provision is state flexibility, a state is
4	allowed to elect not to. There were reports at the time
5	JUDGE RANDOLPH: Aren't there only like three or
6	four that indicated they were considering not setting one up
7	prior to the IRS rule?

MR. DELERY: Right. Again, I'm not sure about the exact timing. I think certainly there were some who said that at the time, more now ultimately decided not to do it.

JUDGE EDWARDS: You're not agreeing with the premise, are you --

MR. DELERY: No.

JUDGE EDWARDS: -- that subsidies were a carrot?

MR. DELERY: No, and I was coming to that, Your Honor. I'm absolutely not. I think it's an after the fact account manufactured without evidence from the record at the time, and in fact, there's no credible indication, I would submit, that Congress intended to sacrifice the principle subsidy that would provide affordable care for Americans across the country as an incentive.

JUDGE EDWARDS: Well, because you're going to gut the individual mandate, which is a principle part of the statute.

MR. DELERY: Right. And that goes --

1	JUDGE EDWARDS: Doesn't make any sense.
2	JUDGE GRIFFITH: But by the same
3	JUDGE RANDOLPH: But Congress did, did, did do just
4	that, not for everybody, but people who make below 100 percent
5	of the poverty figure for a household are not eligible for
6	subsidies, isn't that correct? Is that correct?
7	MR. DELERY: Yes.
8	JUDGE RANDOLPH: It is. It's correct. And the
9	reason for that is that Congress assumed that the states would
10	buy into the Medicaid expansion, and they would be covered by
11	Medicaid, but the fact of the matter is that, I don't know how
12	many states, was it 19 states have not bought into the
13	Medicaid expansion, and so all these people that are 100
14	percent or less are not even eligible for subsidies
15	MR. DELERY: Right.
16	JUDGE RANDOLPH: is that right?
17	MR. DELERY: In the states that have not yet
18	JUDGE RANDOLPH: Yes.
19	MR. DELERY: accepted the Medicaid expansion.
20	The Medicaid expansion, however, was clear in that the
21	additional requirements were made part of the mandatory
22	Medicaid requirements, and a very different situation than
23	here because of the long-standing practice of the Medicaid
24	program states have been operating the joint program with the

federal government under established rules for decades. Here,

25

the Plaintiffs' proposition is that this incentive, which was supposedly so extreme that states would not be able to refuse it, was buried in sub-paragraphs like (b)(2)(a), and (c)(2)(A)(i), in the formula calculation you'd expect --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: If I gave you a table of contents of the, I don't know how many pages this thing is, but the 2,000 pages, and I gave you a table of contents and I asked you please find where, or who is eligible for a subsidy, what section would you look at? Would you look at the section entitled 36B? Wouldn't that be the very first section you'd look at?

MR. DELERY: And 36 -- this is my point, Your Honor, if you look at 36B(a) it provides that the tax credits are available to individuals. The tax credits were not intended as subsidies to state, or grants to states, they were intended as tax credits to federal tax payers, it's a relationship between the federal government and the individuals. And if you look at these provisions in 36B the title is premium assistance, it indicates what Congress thought the purpose of the tax credit was, it was to provide support to defray the costs of the insurance premiums on the exchanges. There's a separate --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Would you agree with me that 36B, which is what you're talking about, and the way it's structured is copied from the Health Coverage Tax Credit Act

24

25

J	51
1	of 2002? Have you looked at that? I don't know.
2	MR. DELERY: I have, awhile ago, Your Honor. I have
3	not looked at it.
4	JUDGE RANDOLPH: Yes.
5	MR. DELERY: And so, I don't know the history of
6	whether it was copied for that. My understanding is that
7	provision expired at January 1st of this year.
8	JUDGE RANDOLPH: Yes, because the states or
9	whatever, but
10	MR. DELERY: Right.
11	JUDGE RANDOLPH: the point is that when you're
12	talking about structure it also begins the individuals, then
13	it goes down to coverage month, and then it says here's the
14	subsidy, it's 72 point what percent, and then it also says
15	that you don't get it unless your state has enacted the
16	following laws.
17	MR. DELERY: Right.
18	JUDGE RANDOLPH: It's the same deal. But, I mean,
19	the structure of that is the same.
20	MR. DELERY: I mean, I believe, Your Honor,
21	although, again, I need to double-check, I think that that
22	provision also included some forms of coverage that were

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Yes, that may be.

Plaintiffs' proposition here.

available nationwide, so it's not exactly an analogy to the

PLU

1	MR. DELERY: In addition to premium assistance,
2	which the tax credits were intended to be in 36B, the statute
3	also provided state assistance, and it's in Section 18031.
4	And
5	JUDGE RANDOLPH: What is that under the Act?
6	MR. DELERY: I'm sorry, it's 1311.
7	JUDGE RANDOLPH: 1311. Okay.
8	MR. DELERY: And sorry about that, Your Honor.
9	So, incentives were provided to states under the cooperative
10	Federalism model to establish their own exchanges, grants to
11	assist in the start up costs, ultimately then the costs would
12	have to be borne by user fees, and also regulatory authority
13	vested in the exchanges to, among other things to find the
14	scope of qualified health plans that would be offered through
15	the exchanges. So, states if they wanted to elect to create
16	an exchange they had an incentive to do it in terms of grants,
17	and regulatory authority that they would be allowed to do.
18	But significantly
19	JUDGE RANDOLPH: Was it after 2015 that they're on
20	their own?
21	MR. DELERY: The grants expire, and once the
22	exchanges are up and running they have to be supported through
23	user fees, not through the grant money. But
24	JUDGE GRIFFITH: If I were to disagree with you and
25	think that established by the state under 1311 means

established by the state is your argument over, or?

MR. DELERY: So, I think, Your Honor, no. And there are a few other provisions that indicate that at the very least if you disagree that with our reading that that's the plain reading of the statute, at the very least there's ambiguity and interpretive tension between provisions of the Act that suggest that interpretation by the agency delegated with the authority to issue the regulations here is entitled to deference, and I point to a few of them. One is the reporting requirements under 36B(f)(3), that statute makes clear that Congress expected the federal premium tax credits to be available on the federal exchange, there's the express reference to the authority of both the exchanges created by the state under 1311 --

JUDGE GRIFFITH: I think Mr. Carvin's response to that, I don't want to put words in his mouth, is that well, that's to monitor the individual mandate, right? It wasn't just to check on true upping premium assistance, but it could also be used to monitor the individual mandate.

MR. DELERY: I think that's not right, Your Honor.

The title of the section is reconciliation of credit and advance credit. So, Congress is saying what the purpose is for, it also expressly contemplates that the exchanges would be, including the federal exchanges would be providing the tax credits, and so --

1	JUDGE RANDOLPH: This was not part of the Affordable
2	Care Act.
3	MR. DELERY: It was added in the HCERA, the
4	reconciliation bill, afterwards, and
5	JUDGE RANDOLPH: So, it's an amendment to the
6	Affordable Care Act.
7	MR. DELERY: Right. Which shows that
8	JUDGE RANDOLPH: That you're using to show what was
9	meant in the Affordable Care Act.
10	MR. DELERY: I think it shows a confirmation, Your
11	Honor, that
12	JUDGE GRIFFITH: Hasn't the IRS backed off that? I
13	thought just recently they just took a different
14	interpretation that kind of undercuts your argument saying it
15	can't be used for that.
16	MR. DELERY: No, Your Honor, I think what IRS
17	JUDGE GRIFFITH: Maybe Mr. Carvin can address that
18	in his rebuttal, because I thought that.
19	MR. DELERY: I think what the IRS recently did is to
20	stay that because some of this information might be used for
21	other purposes they would as an administrative matter lessen
22	the burden on insurers to provide information under a
23	different provision. But I don't think if you're looking at
24	it as a statutory matter in terms of what Congress understood,

and that Congress understood that federal exchanges would be

providing federal tax credits, that the later change undercuts that all. And the Medicaid maintenance of effort provision is another example.

JUDGE GRIFFITH: The legislative history is a wash, right? I mean, you parry and they thrust, or they thrust and you parry, there doesn't seem to be any clear legislative history here showing that this was an item of great concern to Congress, other than the text itself, I realize the text, but I'm talking about the legislative, field of legislative --

MR. DELERY: Right.

JUDGE GRIFFITH: -- history I feel I'm not comfortable going into, but Sierra Club suggests that we need to look at it. But you have a special burden to bear there, don't you? Given the plain language established by the state don't you have a special burden to show from legislative history that that doesn't mean what it appears to mean?

JUDGE EDWARDS: Isn't the legislative history clear on the importance of the individual mandate?

MR. DELERY: Yes, Your Honor. I think that there's a legislative history answer, and there's also a statement of purpose that comes from the text and structure.

JUDGE GRIFFITH: But is there discussion in the individual mandate that talks about whether the subsidy is conditioned upon being a federal or state exchange? I don't think there's anything --

25

1	MR. DELERY: No, but there is a provision, it's in
2	1501A of the Affordable Care Act, Your Honor, that lists out
3	several findings about the operation of the individual
4	mandate. It makes clear that the subsidies were viewed as an
5	integral part of the effectiveness of that program, and that's
6	in the text of the statute, we don't need to resort to
7	legislative history on that point. If you do resort to
8	legislative history, Your Honor, you know, I think
9	JUDGE GRIFFITH: But how does that undercut Mr.
10	Carvin's argument? They needed the individual mandate, they
11	needed the subsidies, and IRS messed it up, right?
12	MR. DELERY: Right.
13	JUDGE GRIFFITH: By changing the deal, how does
14	that
15	MR. DELERY: Right.
16	JUDGE GRIFFITH: undercut his argument?
17	MR. DELERY: I think that there are several aspects
18	of the, again, of the legislative history, and I think closely
19	related to text and purpose. I think given that the text
20	itself said what the purpose of the statute was, which was to
21	provide affordable care for all Americans, it's in the name of
22	the statute, and it's in the title of Title One
23	JUDGE GRIFFITH: Well, so that raises the next

question, if we know a clear purpose of Congress, and yet they

don't legislate clearly enough to achieve that purpose is it

1 | our job to fix the problem?

MR. DELERY: I think what the Supreme Court has said, and what this Court has said, so the Supreme Court in Brown & Williamson, and Maracich and other cases in this Court in cases that have been discussed here have said that in order to answer that question about whether, you know, what text of a statute means, whether it's clear or whether it's ambiguous you need to look at all of the canons of statutory interpretation.

JUDGE GRIFFITH: Right. Right.

MR. DELERY: And in Brown & Williamson, for example, the Supreme Court looked to the structure of the law to identify the overall purpose and concluded that given that, again looking at text and structure, a potential reading of one provision was off the table --

JUDGE GRIFFITH: Sure. Sure.

MR. DELERY: -- because, you know. And so, it's the same here.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Do you know of any cases, do you know of any let's just stick to the Supreme Court, any Supreme Court cases that stand for the following proposition that although we have the text of the statute it seems perfectly clear on its fact if we look at another provision and we give that a plain meaning, that other provision we give a plain meaning, then we have an anomaly and what we have to do is

change the provision that seems to be clear rather than change the provision that causes the anomaly. You know, I know the absurdity principle, and that, but if Congress is Janus-faced, if it's pointing in one direction here and one direction there I don't know of any, there's an absurdity principle, but I don't think there's a stupidity principle.

MR. DELERY: Right.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: If the legislation is just stupid I don't see that it's up to the Court to save it.

MR. DELERY: And I would strongly disagree, Your Honor, with the proposition that that applies here. But I think on the question about the Supreme Court --

JUDGE GRIFFITH: Or to spin it a little bit, or also if there's a political compromise that's --

MR. DELERY: Right.

JUDGE GRIFFITH: -- struck that may not achieve the total purpose, I mean, there's purposes of statutes, and then sometimes those can be attained, sometimes those can't be attained until political compromises are struck. How are we supposed to take that into account?

MR. DELERY: Right.

JUDGE GRIFFITH: Your argument seems to be there's an overall purpose, we ought to be hell bent on pursuing that, and that ought to be our goal.

MR. DELERY: Right.

JUDGE GRIFFITH: How does that account for the fact that there may be political compromise along --

MR. DELERY: Right.

JUDGE GRIFFITH: -- the way that detracts from that purpose but maybe has some ancillary --

MR. DELERY: Right.

JUDGE GRIFFITH: -- political purpose?

MR. DELERY: So, I think the short answer, Your
Honor, I'll come back to it in a second, is that this is not
an untethered purpose argument, this is a purpose argument
based on the text and structure of the law where Congress
legislated as it did, it spoke the way it did, it set up a
system of nested provisions that when you walk through them
lead to the conclusion that the federal exchange stands in the
place of a state exchange where the state elects not to set it
up.

On the Supreme Court case question, Your Honor, and I'll come back, actually, to the political compromise point because I want to respond to Mr. Carvin on that, but on the Supreme Court case I think one that comes to mind is the Maracich case, which if I'm pronouncing that correctly is one about the Driver Privacy Protection Act, and Justice Kennedy's opinion says if we look just at this particular provision it seems to have a very broad scope, nothing about this paragraph suggests that it wouldn't cover what's at issue here. But if

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 we look at other provisions of the case --JUDGE RANDOLPH: Yes, well, that's a common method, 2 that's a common method of --3 4 MR. DELERY: Right. 5 JUDGE RANDOLPH: -- of, but what we've got here is 6 language that doesn't seem to be malleable in any way, shape, 7 or form for many of the reasons that Judge Griffith mentioned. I mean, it's an exchange established by a state pursuant to 8 9 1311, means an exchange established by the federal government pursuant to 1321, that doesn't -- look, the reporting 10 11 requirement it seems to me cuts against you, because there 12 Congress in amending the statute recognized the dichotomy 13 between the two different exchanges, one under 1311, and one under 1321, but they didn't with respect to the subsidy 14 15 eligibility. 16 MR. DELERY: I think that's not right, Your Honor. 17 I think the reference to the two provisions, parts of 1311 and 18 1321, and the parenthetical in 36B(f)(3) --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Yes, that's what I had in mind. Yes.

MR. DELERY: -- A) I think it demonstrates that Congress expected that the credits would be available on both type of exchanges; but B) those are not, those are subreferences to the authority of the exchanges to contract some of the responsibilities of the exchanges to others --

1	JUDGE RANDOLPH: I understand.
2	MR. DELERY: that, and so, it's not speaking,
3	it's not pointing to the states shall establish and exchange
4	provision, it's in there for that particular reason to point
5	to the, to make clear that if either of those two sources of
6	authority for contracting is invoked these reporting
7	requirements still apply.
8	JUDGE EDWARDS: There is
9	MR. DELERY: But that would only be I'm sorry,
10	Your Honor.
11	JUDGE EDWARDS: No, go ahead.
12	MR. DELERY: It would only make sense for that to be
13	there, and for that to be true if the federal exchanges were
14	offering tax credits. I'm sorry, Your Honor.
15	JUDGE EDWARDS: There is legislative history in the
16	brief submitted by members of Congress and the state
17	legislators pointing to the Senate Finance Committee report
18	MR. DELERY: Right.
19	JUDGE EDWARDS: and they say, they use the
20	words
21	MR. DELERY: Yes.
22	JUDGE EDWARDS: to establish, the Feds would
23	establish a state exchange.
24	MR. DELERY: Right.
25	JUDGE EDWARDS: And there are three because

everyone understood what was going on, and then there were three House committees --

MR. DELERY: Yes.

JUDGE EDWARDS: -- who said if that happens the individuals who would be supported by the subsidy are folks who couldn't otherwise afford it, nothing to indicate that it was conditioned on who created the exchange.

MR. DELERY: Right.

JUDGE EDWARDS: No one assumed that this was what was in play.

MR. DELERY: I think that is absolutely correct,
Your Honor. And the point about the Senate Finance Committee
report, and this reference appears on page 193 of the Joint
Appendix, is important, to respond to Judge Randolph's
question, because I think it, it shows, and I think this is
something that Plaintiffs concede on pages six and seven of
their reply brief, that there is nothing that puts outside,
that puts it beyond Congress' power to define an exchange
established by the state to mean an exchange established by
the District of Columbia, or the territories, or the federal
government, the question is, you know, has Congress done that?
They would submit that there is some sort of new plain
statement rule that says that the way Congress did it is not
sufficiently clear. Our position is if you follow the canons
of interpretation as this Court's precedent and the Supreme

Court precedent require, you come to the conclusion that

Congress intended the Secretary to establish such exchange,

which again I think is a key statutory term, it doesn't mean,

it doesn't say an exchange, it means such exchange suggesting

the same.

And so, at the very least, back to the point about interpretive ambiguity, to the extent that you conclude that our reading is not the only plausible one, although we think it is when you read it all together, it's certainly a natural reading, I would submit the most natural reading, and a reasonable reading, and so therefore it's entitled to deference under the established precedent.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Mr. Delery?

MR. DELERY: Yes?

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Before you sit down, you haven't addressed this, and I don't know that Mr. Carvin did either, but I'd like to ask you, I'm trying to remember, what struck me was you were talking about canons of interpretation, and there's an ancient canon of interpretation that goes back to the 1800s, and I think the Supreme Court case is Yazoo, are you familiar with that?

MR. DELERY: Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Yes. And that's the one that says that you, whatever this means, you strictly interpret tax credits, and tax matters, and so on and so forth, and that if

it's clear you err on the side of the Federal Treasury, that is you don't give the money. Now, how much -- well, do you have a response to that?

MR. DELERY: I do, Your Honor, and there are a couple of them. One is, you know, there certainly are cases, Yazoo and others, that suggest that there's a, you know, a presumption in some circumstances, although Congress, I'm sorry, the Court has never said that it's the kind of clear statement rule that the Plaintiffs are talking about, and here there's no question that Congress intended tax credits, this isn't a situation of implying them out of full cloth, 36B provides for tax credits. There's also, we would submit, more important --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Refundable tax credits.

MR. DELERY: Refundable tax credits.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Which is a euphemism for subsidy.

MR. DELERY: Yes.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Yes.

MR. DELERY: But I think there's a more important principle reflected again in the Supreme Court's cases that revenue laws are to be construed to provide a nationwide system of tax administration, uniform in its application, and that ordinarily, and that's the *Irvine* case that we've cited in our brief, and ordinarily Congress is presumed not to tie the effective federal statute, or benefit on state action,

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

65 1 that is in the Mississippi Band of Choctaw case, as well. 2 I think here given that Congress has provided for tax credits, and --3 JUDGE RANDOLPH: I don't know about that last one, because --5 6

MR. DELERY: Yes.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: -- 26 U.S.C. Section 35 does just that with respect to subsidies for healthcare.

MR. DELERY: Right. I think that here what you have is that Congress has established, you know, we would submit its day to day purpose in the text to create a nationwide system to provide affordable healthcare, and if delegated to Treasury in 36B(g) the authority to implement the provision, and in particular the authority to provide rules for the coordination of the credit with the advanced credit program administered by HHS. So, here unlike in some of the other situations --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: You know, I understand that. mean, all questions of government are questions of ends and means, and if you change one you change the other, too, and that's what we're talking about here.

MR. DELERY: Right. And I think this goes back to Judge Edwards' point from before, I think that there is no suggestion from the time that the members of Congress understood that this is what the Plaintiffs' theory is what

these provisions were about. They were about premium assistance for individuals so that they could get affordable healthcare. And the states at the time, you know, the Amicus brief includes a survey of reports of commissions at the time that states decided to, whether or not to set up their own exchanges, there's no discussion of that there, either. And on the eve of the vote in 2010, as Judge Edwards mentioned a moment ago, three House committees made, and this is at 272 and 273 of the Joint Appendix, published a summary indicating the exchanges, the tax credits were available on all of the exchanges. So, I think if you look at the bargain that was struck, the bargain that was struck was to pursue the ultimate goal of providing affordable healthcare, states were given the opportunity, they wanted to create the exchanges to do that, but if not the states would step in.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Can I ask you about the March 12 letter that you all submitted? I was a little puzzled by it.

Is it the view of the Government that if we were to invalidate the IRS ruling that the force of our ruling would apply only to Mr. Klemencic? Is that the gravamen of this?

MR. DELERY: I do think, Your Honor, that the, obviously, we think that that should not be the result, but that any remedies should be tailored to the parties with standing here, and not more broadly. And in fact, I think that Plaintiffs' Counsel recognizes the appropriate scope of

2.5

the relief here because they have filed case --1 JUDGE GRIFFITH: But if we invalidate an IRS rule 2 that has broad applicability, doesn't it? 3 Right. 4 MR. DELERY: JUDGE GRIFFITH: Do you have any authority for that? 5 Is this a position the Government has taken before? 6 Yes, Your Honor. 7 MR. DELERY: JUDGE GRIFFITH: Because it seems you run in the 8 face of precedent. MR. DELERY: Well, no, I disagree, Your Honor. 10 think that under the APA the relief should be tailored to the 11 agency action, which here is the --12 JUDGE GRIFFITH: If we determine that the IRS didn't 13 have the authority to issue this rule, you're saying it would 14 apply only to Mr. Klemencic? It wouldn't have broader 15 applicability? 16 MR. DELERY: Well, again, because --17 In APA we do that all the time. 18 JUDGE GRIFFITH: MR. DELERY: But I think this is not a situation, 19 20 and this goes to some of the other threshold arguments that we have made, including about the refund action. This is not a 21 situation where, you know, review of direct, direct review 22 rule-making is vested here in this Court as an opportunity for 23 regulated entities to come here and sue. Under the provision 24

providing for refund actions, Congress has expressly done the

opposite and provided diffuse jurisdiction in all District
Courts, and the Court of Federal Claims. Under 36B
individuals elsewhere will have, you know, a claim for the tax
refund, they can bring those cases elsewhere, and the
Plaintiffs' Counsel recognizes that, so that right now a case
was filed last year across the river in Virginia, four
different individuals making exactly the same claim, it's
pending in the Fourth Circuit, argument is scheduled for next
month. And so, in the ordinary approach of allowing the law
to develop where the federal government is concerned, and
Circuits around the country that would be the ordinary course
is that that would --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: You know, I have to comment on this, I think you're filing in our Court was highly improper. The fact of the matter is on page 54 of your brief you raise the class action question, and then the Plaintiffs filed a reply brief responding to that argument on page 54 of the red brief, you don't get a sur-reply in this Court without asking special leave, and for that letter to come in, as I said, I think it violated the Court's rules.

MR. DELERY: Okay. Sorry, I think the intent was to provide a case to the Court that seemed to be relevant, and understand your position, Your Honor.

JUDGE GRIFFITH: Was it a new case? Was it -MR. DELERY: It was not a new case. It was

1 obviously one from a few years ago.

JUDGE GRIFFITH: Isn't that what 28J normally is

for? 28J is normally for a new -- okay.

JUDGE EDWARDS: Why don't you just say --

MR. DELERY: Right.

JUDGE EDWARDS: -- respectfully, Your Honor, our argument has been submitted, I'll sit down now.

MR. DELERY: I will do that, Your Honor. Thank you very much. Thank you.

JUDGE GRIFFITH: Okay. Mr. Carvin, we'll give you five minutes.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL A. CARVIN, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS

MR. CARVIN: Thank you, Your Honor. I'd like to begin by answering some of the questions you asked, and Judge Randolph. First with respect to the reporting requirement, the Government argues there's a bit of a mismatch between the title which talks about tax credits, and our point, which is obviously the Government wants information on all kinds of purchases on the exchanges that are not subsidized, and I think the answer is, as Judge Randolph's pointed out, that was an amendment to the PPACA, and so they just sort of stuck it in the relevant provision, but obviously, the Government has very much interest in who's buying and how much they're paying for in these exchanges regardless of whether or not they're

2.5

1 subsidized. I'd also make the point --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Isn't there another point, Mr.

Carvin, about the reporting requirement?

MR. CARVIN: Yes.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: The report goes to the Secretary of the Treasury, but it also goes to each individual citizen, and in the states that have federal exchanges those people are going to get reports from the federal government saying that your subsidy, we're afraid, is zero. And that puts tremendous political pressure it seems to me on the governors and the state legislators in those states who haven't set exchanges.

MR. CARVIN: Just to be clear, it says the report doesn't just go to the Secretary, it goes to the tax payers, so you want to correct --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Right.

MR. CARVIN: -- factual mistakes, you want to accomplish the point you did. I'll point out it took three declarations from the head of CMS to figure out what Klemencic's subsidy was. So, we need to figure out, we need to have this very accurate check. Their original argument before the latest 28J filing was, oh, we don't need this information from the exchanges, we get it from the insurers, but the IRS just told you we don't care about what the insurers send us because the exchange is the best source of the information.

The Government erects a cathedral around the word such and says that this somehow changes things, it doesn't change things, all such means is they're not telling the Secretary to set up any old exchange, it's such exchange, they want it to replicate as best they can what's in the state, but all that tells you is what kind of exchanges, and 36B doesn't turn on what kind of exchange it is, it turns on who established the exchange. So, when HHS establishes such exchange then obviously it is not the state that is establishing such exchange.

The key point I want to make, because I don't think we made it clearly in our brief is if you look at the provision saying the territories shall be treated like states, that's 1323 of the Act, there it says territories shall establish such exchange, the 1311 exchange, and be treated like a state. So, we know that no one in Congress thought that such exchange meant to be treated like a state because of the territorial provision.

In response to Judge Randolph's question about whether or not if you find it absurd in Section X whether you can sort of transport that to Section Y, I think probably the best answer is Duke Energy, which is at 127 Supreme Court 1423, and they say normally we presume that the language means the same in differential provisions, but they didn't in that case because there was contextual differences. Well,

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

obviously, if your rationale for not interpreting state to mean state in one provision is state can't mean state because it's absurd, that provides you no justification for not interpreting state to mean state where as in 36B it doesn't lead to an absurd result.

In terms of whether or not you stop at the plain language, Judge Griffith, I agree you do look at other canons of construction, but one canon of construction which is ancient but is used frequently by this Court, Judge Tatel in 1997 said we are not granting tax credits unless they're established unequivocally and conclusively. So, you never get to Chevron because if there is ambiguity in the granting of the tax credit in these circumstances then the Government loses because the canon resolves it, not the agency. He says there's a canon for a nationwide system, we are advocating a nationwide system. The same rule applies in every state, you get the subsidy, the tax credit, if you go on an exchange established by the state, that's nationwide just like saying you get a tax credit if you go to an accredited institution. The fact that only a subset of the citizenry takes advantage of it doesn't mean that we've created some kind of a dual system.

Finally, in terms of this whole legislative history debate, I don't think this Court or the Supreme Court could have been any clearer that if the statute says X, that's the

end of the inquiry, you don't go fishing around legislative history. But if you did engage in that activity here you wouldn't find a scintilla of legislative history in any way contradicting or undermining the plain language. They're making a dog doesn't bark argument that it doesn't echo the plain language of the statute, but surely no one's ever required legislative history that repeats verbatim the statutory language, and they can't point to a scintilla of legislative history to support their completely atextual interpretation of 1321, which for the first time in American history would mean that state means federal. Unless there are further questions. Thank you.

JUDGE GRIFFITH: Thank you very much. The case is

JUDGE GRIFFITH: Thank you very much. The case is submitted.

(Recess.)

DIGITALLY SIGNED CERTIFICATE

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcription of the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

Cauda Unda was

Paula Underwood

March 28, 2014

DEPOSITION SERVICES, INC.