Don’t expect the administrative state to disarm itself

Last week, I read two articles in the summer 2026 edition of the Cato Institute’s Regulation magazine: “Defanging the FCC” by Paul Matzko and “Reforming the PCAOB” by Christina Ho. In the spirit of Don Boudreaux’s blog, Cafe Hayek, here’s what I would have submitted if the magazine accepted letters to the editor:

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Paul Matzko’s “Defanging the FCC” documents a serious problem in American communications policy. For nearly a century, the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) vague public interest standards for issuing broadcast licenses have welcomed “executive abuse, petty corruption, and partisan weaponization,” with Chairman Carr’s FCC serving as only the most recent example. Matzko proposes reforms on procedural, structural, and fundamental grounds, though he emphasizes the third.

I am unconvinced that a “spectrum rush” alone would eliminate abuse. Privatization would eliminate only one source of regulatory leverage, and Matzko’s procedural and structural reforms place too much faith in a politicized FCC to revise its own rules and in a polarized Congress to redesign an agency by statute.

He advocates an overhaul that preserves the FCC’s “useful functions” and opposes its abolition. But even his strongest proposal — “guaranteed to eliminate the FCC’s abuse problem” — is not enough on its own to achieve his primary goal.

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In “Reforming the PCAOB,” Christina Ho identifies legitimate deficiencies in the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and offers two reforms. The first would transfer the Board’s duties and powers to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by statute, but the second, intended as a contingency for legislative inaction, is redundant.

Her administrative alternative would require the PCAOB — which Ho admits has a “virtually unlimited budget with minimal oversight” — to voluntarily curb its own power. The Board has neither an incentive to innovate nor the ability to create a public-private partnership, and only a congressional amendment to Sarbanes-Oxley would allow the SEC to take over enforcement. Additionally, why would a PCAOB chair separate those dual roles unless forced to do so?

If reform must depend on Congress and if we can’t trust the PCAOB to reform itself, then meaningful change can only start with legislation. Congress should listen to Ho and act accordingly.