Sanctioning Russia Act: Tariffs won’t change Putin’s mind

When Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) passed away last week, he left behind a bill called the Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026. Congress is considering passing the bill in his honor. It should find other ways to preserve Graham’s memory. His bill would not change Putin’s mind or improve Ukraine’s odds of victory. It would also harm America’s economic and foreign policy interests.

I will confine my critiques in this post to Sections 112 and 113 of the not-yet-available online 2026 version of the bill, which have to do with tariffs. This new bill supersedes the 2025 version, which is no longer under consideration. Section 112 would impose up to a 500 percent tariff on Russian goods. Section 113 would impose up to a 100 percent tariff on the five countries who import the most energy from Russia.

Section 112, which affects only direct US-Russian trade, would have very little economic effect. The US imports only about $4.4 billion of Russian goods per year. This is roughly 1/780 of America’s more than $3.4 trillion total imports in 2025. Russia’s exports to the US are less than one percent of its $466 billion in total exports, so Russia would barely notice, either.

This exposes Section 112’s main flaw: it will not change Putin’s mind on Ukraine. After four years of war with no end in sight, a new tariff affecting less than one percent of Russian exports will not suddenly convince Putin to withdraw his forces. Graham’s tariffs would not accomplish their primary goal.

Section 113 is a bigger deal, both economically and diplomatically. This would impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on goods from the five countries that import the most Russian-origin crude oil and natural gas energy. These countries typically include a mix of China, India, Turkey, and various European countries. The exact members vary from year to year and by energy type. Section 113 also applies to certain countries that facilitate Russian oil sanctions evasion.

China is typically Russia’s biggest energy customer. A 100 percent tariff on China has the same problem as Section 112’s 500 percent Russia tariff: it won’t change anyone’s mind with respect to the war in Ukraine. We already learned this in China’s case with escalating tariffs over both Trump administrations that briefly peaked at 145 percent.

Those tariffs were intended to convince China to make needed reforms on intellectual property theft, state control or ownership of foreign businesses, and other unfair trading practices. They didn’t work. Beijing did not make a single substantive reform.

A 100 percent Section 113 tariff would fail against China for an additional reason regarding Russia-China relations. On July 13, two days after Graham’s death, The Wall Street Journal reported on a Russia-China summit:

Before Putin made his 14th trip to meet with Xi in China, he publicly signaled that the two countries would strike a breakthrough agreement on energy. Indeed, his May visit had no bigger ambition than persuading Xi to greenlight a second natural-gas pipeline between Russia and China—known as the Power of Siberia 2, a project two decades in the making that Moscow desperately needs.

But the Russian delegation that flew to Beijing ahead of Putin ran into a brick wall. Chinese officials made it clear to the visiting head of Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned gas giant, that they would sign up to the pipeline only if Russia sold them gas at the same lower-than-market rate Moscow sells domestically, said people with knowledge of the talks. In essence, Beijing was asking the Kremlin to subsidize the project. 

In other words, Xi is asserting dominance over Putin. A tariff from the US is not going to convince Xi to give up that show of superiority. This is especially true in light of the hurt Chinese officials still feel at Russia treating China as a junior partner during the Soviet era. This role reversal is something Xi and other top Chinese officials have coveted for a long time.

India is an important counterweight to China’s power in Asia. This makes positive US-India relations very important. A 100 percent tariff would not help matters and could play right into Beijing’s hands.

Turkey is another big Russian energy importer that would be subject to the 100 percent Section 113 tariff. The US might need its help if the Iran war continues for much longer. It would not be in America’s interest to upset Turkey with another tariff, especially if that same Iran war is restricting some of Turkey’s other energy sources.

Then there is Europe. One or two EU member states typically rank among Russia’s top-five energy importers, depending on the resource type. This raises a feasibility problem with Graham’s bill. Europe has a common trade policy, which may complicate imposing tariffs against just one or two of the 27 EU members, though that is unclear at the moment. Section 113 also has potential rules-of-origin, trade-agreement, and diplomatic issues.

It could also conflict with commitments under the recently implemented US-EU trade framework that could affect more than $600 billion worth of imports from important allies.

Congress is welcome to honor Lindsey Graham’s memory, but it should not do so by passing the Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026. Graham may have intended his bill to be symbolic messaging. Given its feasibility problems and ineffectiveness, it should remain that way.